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Abstract: There are two main regulatory approaches in relation to private sale-of-control 
transactions. The ‘market rule’ confers maximum freedom on a company’s incumbent 
controller by enabling a sale of shares (hence of control over the company) to any acquirer 
offering an acceptable price. This concept applies to most private sale-of-control transactions 
in the US. On the other hand, the ‘mandatory bid rule’ requires a potential acquirer to offer a 
buy-out to all remaining shareholders once he obtains control over a company. The mandatory 
bid rule has its origins in the UK and now applies throughout the EU and in many other 
jurisdictions. Under a mandatory bid, the price offered to the remaining shareholders by the 
acquirer must be at least equal to the consideration received by the incumbent controller. This 
effectively prevents transactions with potential acquirers who are unable to offer a price 
acceptable to the incumbent controller to all shareholders of the company. While this warrants 
that no value-destroying control transfers can take place, some value-increasing takeovers are 
also prevented by the rule, potentially reducing the overall level of (beneficial) takeover activity. 
This ‘chilling effect’ of the mandatory bid rule, it is often argued, is too high a price to pay for 
the few advantages offered in exchange. This paper seeks to analyse the determinants for a re-
estimation of the efficiency costs entailed by the mandatory bid and market rules and argues 
that the efficiency advantages of the mandatory bid rule go far beyond simply deterring 
inefficient takeovers. The paper also emphasizes that private benefits of control – especially in 
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the form of synergies – exist irrespective of the level of investor protection offered by a 
particular legal environment. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate takeovers can create value. Although the sources of takeover gains and, 
more generally, the driving forces behind the market for corporate control are still 
subject to much discussion in the legal and economic literature, there seems to 
exist a sufficient body of empirical evidence suggesting that – on aggregate1 – 
takeovers do create value in practice.2 
In widely-dispersed companies, control over a company can be obtained 
through a tender offer addressed to all target shareholders, normally preceded by 
negotiations with the non-owner managers, by making use of statutory merger 
procedures offered by the relevant jurisdiction,3 or, in some limited circumstances, 
through market purchases.4 
Where a company is effectively controlled by one single shareholder,5 
however, a potential acquirer will typically first enter into negotiations with the 
blockholder when seeking control over the company, as the success of the 
transaction will ultimately depend on this blockholder’s willingness to sell his 
shares.6 
Causes for such private control transactions, as well as problems associated 
with them, differ in many respects from those arising in a normal tender offer 
process. With ownership and control not (fully) separated, the corporate 
governance function of the market for corporate control plays a far lesser role, as 
blockholders already have sufficient incentives to effectively monitor ‘their’ 
managers.7 Furthermore, when rendering his decision about the sale of his shares, 
                                                     
1 ie aggregating the returns of target and bidder shareholders. 
2 See, eg, G. Alexandridis, D. Petmezas and N.G. Travlos, ‘Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions Around 
the World: New Evidence’ forthcoming Financial Management Journal (at: ssrn.com/abstract=1423026). 
For an overview of the empirical work on this topic see, also, R. Romano, ‘A Guide to Takeovers: 
Theory, Evidence, and Regulation’ (1992) 9 Yale Journal of Regulation 119, esp 152-155. 
3 Which typically require a combination of board and shareholder approval in most jurisdictions. 
4 P.L. Davies and K.J. Hopt, ‘Control Transactions’ in R Kraakman and others (eds), The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law - A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
ed, 2009) 160. However, market purchases as a way of gaining control over a company are typically 
significantly complicated by various disclosure requirements. 
5 Or, likewise, a coordinated group of shareholders, exercising joint control. 
6 Davies and Hopt, n 4 above, 161. There are, of course, situations where an acquisition can be facilitated 
against the will of the incumbent controller. This will be the case where the (‘unsecure’) blockholder 
controls enough voting rights to dominate the shareholders’ meetings (de facto-control), without, however, 
holding the majority of the voting rights (de jure-control). Differences between de facto and de jure-control 
mainly arise due to passivity and lack of coordination of minority shareholders. 
7 See, eg, P.L. Davies, E.P. Schuster, and E. van de Walle de Ghelcke, ‘The Takeover Directive as a 
Protectionist Tool?’ (ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 141/2010, 2010) at ssrn.com/abstract=1554616, 
14-15; C.G. Holderness, ‘A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control’ (2003) Economic Policy Review 
51, 54-55. 
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the blockholder is neither conflicted in the same way as a non-owner manager,8 
nor as constrained by collective action problems as atomistic shareholders of a 
classical Berle-Means company.9 At the same time, a separate set of problems 
arises in private sale-of-control transactions.  
While it is a rather homogenous shareholder body who votes10 on a control 
transaction in widely dispersed companies, this majority decision is, in effect, 
substituted by the blockholder’s evaluation of the offer. However, a controlling 
blockholder’s economic position can (and often will) differ substantially from a 
mere aggregate of a corresponding number of non-controlling positions; this can 
have a decisive influence on the outcome of the control contest. 
There are two fundamentally different approaches in regulating private sale-
of-control transactions. First, they can be treated like most other sales of private 
property, with the seller keeping all of the consideration paid by the acquirer, and 
the acquirer remaining free to decide whether or not to buy any additional shares 
from the remaining shareholders of the target. Alternatively, the law may impose 
some form of a ‘sharing rule’, requiring the buyer or the seller of a controlling 
block to let outside shareholders participate in the bargain (ie the premium, in 
particular) in one form or the other.  
The former approach is sometimes referred to as ‘market rule’ or ‘private 
negotiation rule’, emphasizing its deregulatory nature; it is the concept normally 
applied in sale-of-control transactions in the US.  
The ‘sharing rule’, on the other hand, is most relevant in the form of the so-
called mandatory bid rule. It is the rule applicable to listed companies throughout 
the EEA since the adoption of the Takeover Directive; it is also applied in many 
other jurisdictions.11 
The classical assessment of the mandatory bid rule by law and economics 
scholars is rather negative. It often argued that the mandatory bid rule prevents 
some desirable (ie efficient) transactions, and therefore creates inefficiency costs, 
                                                     
8 From the voluminous literature see, for example, F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, ‘The Proper Role 
of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer’ (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 1161; J.C. 
Coffee, Jr, ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System’ (1984) 70 Virginia 
Law Review 717; and J. Armour and D.A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and 
Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, regarding problems linked to management discretion; see, also, Report of the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe (2002) 21. 
9 See the classical contribution by A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, [1932] 1968); for collective action and free-rider problems in 
tender offers see, eg, S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart, ‘Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the 
Theory of the Corporation’ (1980) 11 The Bell Journal of Economics 42; L.A. Bebchuk, ‘The Pressure to 
Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy’ (1987) 12 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 911, and L.A. 
Bebchuk, ‘Takeover Bids Below the Expected Value of Minority Shares’ (1989) 24 The Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 171. 
10 Such ‘voting’ does not necessarily involve attending a shareholders’ meeting. It can also take place in 
the form of shareholders ‘voting with their feet’, by either tendering their shares into the bidder’s offer or 
by selling them on the market, thereby (indirectly) facilitating the acquisition by the bidder. 
11 eg, in Australia, Hong Kong, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, and, to some extent, in 
Canada (at least where the bidder pays a premium in excess of 15% over the market price) and Japan. 
Furthermore, the Takeover Directive is also applicable in the remaining EEA member states (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway). 
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which are unlikely to be counterbalanced by the rule’s (undisputed) efficiency 
advantages over the deregulatory approach in certain situations.12 
In this paper, the question of the mandatory bid rule’s efficiency is revisited. 
It will be argued that the mandatory bid rule offers some efficiency advantages 
over the market rule which are not fully taken into account in former analyses. 
The analysis involves substituting the question whether or not a transaction is 
efficient with the question how efficient the transaction with the winning bidder is, 
as compared to other potential outcomes. It will be shown that, in auction-like 
control sales, a US-type market rule often creates suboptimal results, as it fails to 
facilitate control-taking by the most value creating bidder. Not taking this effect 
into account leads to systematic overestimation of the inefficiency costs associated 
with the mandatory bid rule (and similar ‘sharing rules’).  
It will further be shown that these advantages may exist irrespective of the 
level of investor protection offered in a particular jurisdiction. Private benefits of 
control, often associated with illegal conduct by the majority shareholder, 
insufficient investor protection laws and inadequate enforcement, are the main 
drivers for differences of the two rules’ performances. It will be shown that 
synergies play an important role in analysing the optimality of the two rules, and 
that the mandatory bid rule fulfils a role far beyond pure minority protection, 
which cannot simply be substituted by improved investor protection regulation. 
The paper proceeds as follows: the first section will give a short overview of 
the regulatory regimes in the EU and the US, respectively. Section two will 
examine the efficiency implications of both rules in one bidder scenarios, mainly 
following prior analyses in this field. In section three, the two rules will be 
compared in multiple-bidder scenarios (‘auctions’), identifying additional 
advantages of the mandatory bid rule; the fourth part concludes with a summary 
of the findings. 
 
 
 
PRIVATE SALES-OF-CONTROL IN THE EU AND THE US 
 
THE MANDATORY BID RULE 
 
The mandatory bid rule (‘MBR’) has a long history. It can be traced back to the 
adoption of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (‘City Code’) in 1968. The 
City Code was, and continued to be until recently, a self-regulatory, formally non-
                                                     
12 See, eg, F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, ‘Corporate Control Transactions’ (1982) 91 Yale Law 
Journal 698; see, also, S.M. Sepe, ‘Private Sale of Corporate Control: Why the European Mandatory Bid 
Rule is Inefficient’ at: ssrn.com/abstract=1086321, for an overview of the relevant literature. 
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binding body of ‘soft law’, administered by the Takeover Panel.13 The MBR was 
implemented soon after the adoption of the City Code in 1972,14 and has 
remained virtually unquestioned by the Panel since then.15 
First attempts to regulate takeovers on a European level date back to 1974, 
when the so-called ‘Pennington-Report’16 was presented as part of the effort to 
harmonise company law throughout the European Union. The report was strongly 
modelled on the City Code and also suggested the obligatory introduction of a 
MBR on the European level.17 From then on, it took another thirty years until the 
Member States could finally agree on the adoption of a Takeover Directive 
(‘TOD’) in 2004.18 To end the year-long discussions, many of the most 
controversial points had to be ‘watered-down’:19 
The board-neutrality-rule, targeted at preventing defensive actions by the 
management without shareholder approval, and a key element of the City Code,20 
was made ‘optional’21 due to disagreement among member states. The 
breakthrough-rule, which was intended to certain render control enhancing 
mechanisms inoperative in the context of a takeover bid, shared the fate of the 
board-neutrality-rule.22 
The MBR, however, made it into the final text, which can probably be 
explained by the fact that most Member States – in the expectation of a quick(er) 
adoption of the Directive – had already implemented the MBR in their domestic 
                                                     
13 With the implementation of the Takeover Directive, the City Code has been put on a statutory footing, 
which, however, did not substantially change the ‘soft law’-approach; see P.L. Davies, Gower & Davies’ 
Principles of Modern Company Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed, 2008) ch 28-4, and G. Morse, 
‘Implementing the Thirteenth EC Directive - The End of Self-Regulation in Form Only’ (2005) Journal of 
Business Law 403, 404. The City Code is now administered by the Code Committee due to human rights 
legislation (ibid). 
14 Armour and Skeel, n 8 above, 1764-1765. 
15 N. Jennings, ‘Mandatory Bids Revisited’ (2005) 5 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 37, 38. 
16 Report on Takeovers and other Bids (COM Doc XI/56/74). 
17 R. Skog, ‘The Takeover Directive-An Endless Saga?’ (2002) 13 European Business and Organisation Law 
Review 301, 302. 
18 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover 
bids, O.J. L 142, 12. 
19 For a detailed account of the different stages of the law-making process, see, eg, V. Edwards, ‘The 
Directive on Takeover Bids – Not Worth the Paper It’s Written On?’ (2004) 1 European Company and 
Financial Law Review 416; Skog, n 17 above; see, also, B. Clift, ‘The Second Time as Farce? The EU 
Takeover Directive, the Clash of Capitalisms and the Hamstrung Harmonization of European (and 
French) Corporate Governance’ (2009) 47 Journal of Common Market Studies 55, analysing the compromises 
made regarding the board-neutrality-rule and the breakthrough-rule. 
20 But see D. Kershaw, ‘The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’S Takeover Defence 
Prohibition’ (2007) 56 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 267, questioning the rule’s importance in 
the UK with a view to directors’ duties. 
21 ‘Option’ is little more than an euphemism for ‘abolished’, as Member states obviously also had this 
‘option’ absent any Community legislation. However, the TOD requires Member States to at least allow 
companies to change their articles to that effect, which, at least in theory, was not necessarily the case 
before the implementation. See in detail P.L. Davies, E.P. Schuster, and E. van de Walle de Ghelcke, n 7 
above. 
22 The optional arrangements mentioned here are further complicated through a ‘reciprocity exemption’; 
for an overview of the rather complex system, see Davies, Schuster, and van de Walle, ibid; M. Gatti, 
‘Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive’ (2005) 6 European 
Business and Organisation Law Review 553; J. Rickford, ‘The Emerging European Takeover Law from a 
British Perspective’ (2004) 15 European Business Law Review 1379. 
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legal systems, thereby weakening the political opposition.23 The regulation of 
private sale-of-control transactions can therefore be seen as largely harmonised 
throughout the EU. 
 
Main characteristics of the mandatory bid rule 
The MBR, as adopted in the TOD, stipulates a duty on the part of anyone who 
obtains effective control over a listed company, to make a general offer to all 
remaining shareholders of the target to acquire the residual shares.24 There is no 
definition of effective control in the Directive, although most countries chose to 
apply a threshold of 30% of the voting rights.25 
Naturally, the significance of the obligation to make such a takeover offer 
depends primarily on the minimum consideration to be offered to the target 
shareholders. The TOD – following the example of the City Code – requires 
Member States to determine this minimum price by reference to prior acquisitions 
of the bidder. The bidder has to offer to all remaining shareholders a price at least 
equal to the highest price he paid for shares of the target company during the last 
six to twelve months26 before he acquired control of the company.27 
This price rule is the key-reason for the rule sometimes being called ‘equal 
opportunity’ or ‘sharing-rule’.28 The bidder has to treat all shareholders equally by 
offering them the same price for their shares. Moreover, the offer has to be made 
for all outstanding shares. Where the bidder acquires a block from the controlling 
shareholder, all other shareholders are ‘tagged-along’ and receive an equal 
opportunity to sell their shares.  
Any premium the bidder pays to the blockholder also has to be offered to the 
remaining shareholders. This can be seen as forcing the controlling shareholder to 
share ‘his’29 premium with his fellow shareholders. 
To be sure, this largely simplified definition of the MBR (and, likewise, Art 5 
of the Directive) fails to fully take into account other important questions, such as 
the definition of control or the availability of exceptions from the obligation to 
make an offer.30 These questions are outside the scope of the analysis provided 
here; it will be assumed that these rather ‘technical’ points can be sorted out 
separately.  
                                                     
23 For an overview of pre-adoption regulation in Member States, see E. Berglöf and M.C. Burkart, 
‘European Takeover Regulation’ (2003) 18 Economic Policy 171, 187. 
24 See Art 5(1). 
25 See Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, SEC (2007) 268, 9. 
26 The exact duration of this look-back period is to be determined by the Member States; the UK 
continues to apply a 12-month period; CC Rule 9.5. 
27 See TOD, Art 5(4), which defines this price as ‘equitable’.  
28 L.A. Bebchuk, ‘Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control’ (1994) 109 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 957, 968. 
29 Whether the premium should ‘belong’ to the controller is, of course, very controversial; this paper can 
be seen as looking at this question in terms of efficient rule design. 
30 eg, P.L. Davies, ‘The Notion of Equality in Corporate Takeovers’ in J. Payne (ed) Takeovers in English 
and German law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 12-13. 
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Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the MBR is assumed to (i) always be 
triggered where an acquirer obtains de facto-control over a company and (ii) 
effectively require the new controlling shareholder to offer the minority 
shareholders to purchase their shares at a price at least equal to what he paid to the 
former blockholder. 
 
Justifications of the Mandatory Bid Rule and objections 
As stated in the explanatory memorandum of the draft TOD, the Commission 
saw the rationale of the MBR primarily in its ability to protect minority 
shareholders.31 
As Davies puts it, the MBR provides a ‘dramatic example of [a] unilateral exit 
right’ and prevents the acquisition of control over the whole company without 
acquiring (or offering to acquire) all shares.32 If this were possible, it is argued, an 
acquirer might be able to exploit minority shareholders by siphoning assets and 
engaging in self-dealing to the detriment of the minority.33 
Rather than relying on ex post mechanisms to secure fair conduct of 
controlling shareholders towards the other investors, the exit option protects 
minority shareholders by offering them to leave the company at a fair price; it can 
therefore be seen as a substitute for, or an ‘add-on’ to, other minority protection 
devices.34 Adding to minority protection, the MBR could also lower the costs of 
capital, as investors do not have to fear opportunistic buyers expropriating them.35 
The possibility of ‘looters’ taking over control of a company, as well as further 
rationales of the MBR, will be addressed below in more detail. 
Even if the bidder does not run the company to the detriment of the 
minority, it is sometimes argued that the change in the target company’s business 
strategy by the new controller justifies a ‘reinstatement of choice’ by the non-
controlling shareholders,36 although this neglects the fact that even substantial 
changes in a company’s strategy absent a change of control do not lead to a 
comparable exit option.37 
                                                     
31 COM (2002) 534 final, OJ 25.3.2003 C 45/1, 7. See, also, L. Enriques, ‘The Mandatory Bid Rule in the 
Proposed EC Takeover Directive: Harmonization As Rent-Seeking?’ in G. Ferrarini, J. Winter and K.J. 
Hopt (eds), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004) 785. 
32 Davies, n 30 above, 22.  
33 eg, P. Doralt, ‘Der Ökonomische Hintergrund und die Interessengegnsätze bei Übernahmeangeboten’ 
in P. Doralt, C. Nowotny, and M. Schauer (eds), Takeover-Recht – Rechtsvergleichende Berichte, Entwurf der 13. 
EG-Richtlinie 1996 und Österreichischer Ministerialentwurf 1997 (Vienna: WUV Service Fachverlag, 1997) 6; 
Davies, ibid, 785. 
34 This is the reason why the German ‘Konzernrecht’, the body of law dealing with intra-group transactions 
and governance, for a long time had been regarded as a potential alternative to the MBR. See, eg, Doralt, 
ibid 6-7. 
35 This argument also lies at the heart of the ‘law matters’ thesis. For a recent overview see J. Black, 
‘Empirical Legal Studies in Financial Markets: What Have We Learned?’ (2010) LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Paper Series 04-2010, at: ssrn.com/abstract=1543120. 
36 See P. Lee, ‘Takeover Regulation in the UK’ in K.J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds), European Takeovers: 
Law and Practice (London: Butterworths, 1992) 137. 
37 Jennings, n 15 above, 43. 
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Probably the most common objection to the MBR is based on the ‘chilling 
effect’ it has on transfers of corporate control. First, by requiring an offer to be 
made to all shareholders at a price equal to the per-share consideration received by 
the incumbent controller, an otherwise profitable transaction38 might lose its 
economic rationale for the bidder.39 Furthermore, as a bid is required for all shares 
of the company, the bidder might face financing problems, and would be required 
to concentrate more funds in one investment, therefore depriving him of 
diversification possibilities.40 
Finally, it has been argued that more direct regulation might be better suitable 
to deal with value-decreasing takeovers,41 especially as control transactions are 
believed to be favourable on average.42 Clark, on the other hand, counters that a 
sharing requirement – equivalent to a MBR – may have the advantage of offering 
‘more bang for the buck’ than direct regulation.43 
The MBR therefore remains a controversial subject; although its capabilities 
to prevent inefficient takeovers are undisputed, many scholars, especially law and 
economics scholars, doubt the necessity of the protection it offers, given the ‘high 
cost’ of the rule.  
 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE US 
 
Division between Federal and State-level legislation 
Sale-of-control transactions in the US are often said to be subject to a ‘market rule’ 
(‘MR’), also called a ‘private negotiation rule’,44 allowing the seller and the bidder 
to agree privately on a control transfer without an obligation to share the premium 
(and, hence, the transaction gains) with the remaining investors in a subsequent 
bid.45 Technically, such a statement is not entirely accurate, as no single national 
corporate law exists in the US. 
Takeover law is positioned on the interface of company law and securities 
regulation.46 Whereas in Europe, both areas generally fall into the competence of 
                                                     
38 Depending on the approach taken, profitable transaction, in this context, can either refer to a (Pareto 
efficient) transaction leaving all shareholders better off (albeit to varying extents), or to a merely overall 
value increasing transaction, where gains by some shareholders are partly ‘subsidised’ by other 
shareholders (which would still pass the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test). 
39 eg, Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above; Bebchuk, n 28 above; Enriques, n 31 above, 785. We will 
return to this in detail further below. 
40 eg, G. Javaras, ‘Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews’ 
(1965) 32 University of Chicago Law Review 420, 425-426, but see the objections by Bebchuk, n 28 above, 
970-971, and R. Clark, Corporate Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986) §11.4, 497. 
41 eg, Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above, 719; see, also, Jennings, n 15 above, 43. 
42 Enriques, n 31 above, 785-786. 
43 Clark, n 40 above, §11.4, 497-498. 
44 eg, Bebchuk, n 28 above, 964. 
45 Thus, the MR is probably best described as the absence of a rule, rather than a rule. 
46 eg, Doralt, n 33 above, 6; Jennings, n 15 above, 38; B. Clarke, ‘The Takeover Directive: Is a Little 
Regulation Better Than No Regulation?’ (2009) 15 European Law Journal 174, 175. 
  
Edmund-Philipp Schuster                               Efficiency in Private Control Sales  
 
 9
Community legislation,47 the distinction between the two areas has important 
implications in the US. It is the (nowadays admittedly blurred)48 dividing line 
between State and Federal-level legislation. Following legislative developments 
dating back to the “New Deal”-era, securities regulation became a matter of 
exclusive Federal regulation.49 Corporate law, on the other hand, remains primarily 
the authority of the States, which means that there are 50 different corporate laws 
and courts.50 
The influence this division of competences had on the development on 
corporate law (and particularly takeover law) in the US is subject to a long-
standing academic debate51 and lies outside the scope of this paper. What is 
important to note, however, is the absence of a unitary US takeover regulation, 
comparable to the legislation passed under the TOD. Moreover, Federal law in the 
US neither contains a MBR, nor does it preclude States from enacting such a rule. 
 
Fiduciary duties and sharing control 
As it became clear that states were precluded by the Williams Act from taking 
legislative steps in the area we can broadly describe as takeover process and disclosure 
regulation, a second wave of State legislation arrived – the so-called State anti-
takeover laws.52 
Rather than (directly) adding to the requirements of the Williams Act, these 
statutes made use of the States’ competence to regulate general corporate law to 
give effect to their policy considerations. However, only three States (excluding 
Delaware) used this power to enact a rule comparable to the MBR.53 
                                                     
47 Although the Community’s power to harmonise these areas (especially company law) is not without its 
limitations, European legislation now covers many areas of core company law, and the EC is now the 
most important legislator in securities regulation throughout Europe; see E. Wymeersch, ‘About 
Techniques of Regulating Companies in the European Union’ in G. Ferrarini, J. Winter, and K.J. Hopt 
(eds), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
161-169, for an overview of the law-making powers of the EC, and N. Moloney, EC Securities Regulation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 4, regarding the EC’s dominant role as securities 
regulator throughout the Community. 
48 Over the past decades, federal regulation increasingly intruded what could be seen as core company law 
(eg, through application of s 10b of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5); see Clark, n 
40 above, §8.11.1. Similarly, R. Romano, ‘The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law’ (1986) 8 
Cardozo Law Review 709, points to the ‘invasive growth of [federal] regulation’ through securities law. See, 
also, L.A. Bebchuk, ‘Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review 1435, 1438. 
49 Armour and Skeel, n 8 above, 1776-1777. 
50 Romano, n 48 above; Bebchuk, n 48 above, 1438; R. Daines, ‘Does Delaware Law Improve Firm 
Value?’ (2001) 62 Journal of Financial Economics 525. 
51 The debate started with W.L. Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware’ (1974) 
83 Yale Law Journal 663. See L.A. Bebchuk, A. Cohen, and A. Ferrell, ‘Does the Evidence Favor State 
Competition in Corporate Law?’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1775, for an overview of the voluminous 
literature, Armour and Skeel, n 8 above, for (additional) alternative explanations; see, also, M. Kahan and 
E. Kamar, ‘The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law’ (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 679, 
questioning the existence of a competition among states. 
52 M. Lipton and M. Panner, ‘Takeover Bids and United States Corporate Governance’ in D.D. Prentice 
and P.R.J. Holland (eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1993). 
53 C. Bergström, P. Högfeldt, and J. Molin, ‘The Optimality of the Mandatory Bid Rule’ (1997) 13 Journal 
of Law, Economics, & Organization 433, 434. 
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This, combined with the outstanding role of Delaware as a provider of 
corporate law to listed companies,54 makes the statement that ‘US-law’ does not 
provide for a MBR seem like a justified and practical simplification. 
Turning away from State legislation, however, it is worth noting that – unlike 
regulation targeted specifically at the takeover process – the principle of fiduciary 
duties is largely homogenous throughout the US.55 In fact, there exists a long-
standing debate regarding the question whether or not the incumbent controller’s 
fiduciary duties require letting non-controlling shareholders participate in a control 
premium he receives when selling his shares.56 
Some proponents, most prominently Andrews,57 advocated testing the scope 
of fiduciary duties by reference to their aim of preventing unequal distribution of 
profit opportunities, which, in their view, called for a duty to share the premium. 
Similarly, Berle and Means considered the control premium to be an asset 
belonging to the company,58 which would as well provide a theoretical 
underpinning of the sharing requirement. However, these arguments do not seem 
to have convinced US courts.59  
As Hamilton already put it in 1985: ‘It is unlikely that any American court 
today would reject the general proposition that controlling shareholders may 
obtain a premium for their shares which they need not share with other 
shareholders.’60 
Although the law rejects a general duty of incumbent controllers to share the 
premium they receive when selling their shares (and de facto-control), it does not 
embrace the strict deregulatory approach either.61 Instead, it defines three main 
exceptions to the MR.62 Where these exceptions apply, an ‘equal sharing rule’ is 
triggered and replaces the default MR.63 
The first exception concerns the sale to known or suspected ‘looters’, ie 
acquirers who are likely to misappropriate corporate assets after the transaction.64 
                                                     
54 More than 50% of all listed US corporations are domiciled in Delaware; the closest competitor, New 
York, has a ‘market share’ of merely 5%; Kahan and Kamar, n 51 above. 
55 See, eg, J.T. Walsh, ‘The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law’ (2002) 27 Journal of Corporate Law 333, 
describing the historical development in the US. 
56 An early proponent of such a ‘sharing rule’ is Professor Andrews (eg W.D. Andrews, ‘The 
Stockholder’s Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares’ (1965) 78 Harvard Law Review 505); in 
favour of the deregulatory approach, see, eg, Javaras, n 40 above, and Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 
above. See the overview given by R. Hamilton, ‘Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand 
Today’ (1985) 36 Case-Western Reserve Law Review 248. 
57 Andrews, ibid 545. Andrews acknowledges, however, that the Delaware courts’ readiness to allow 
corporate managers to respond to ‘green-mailing’ by offering above-market prices to buy shares, seems to 
embrace the opposite view (a maiore, since, in this case, even corporate funds are used unequally). 
58 Berle and Means, n 9 above, 215-218; this view was explicitly rejected in Honigman v Green Giant Co., 
309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 US 941 (1963). 
59 Hamilton, n 56 above, 249. Sepe, n 12 above, 17. 
60 Hamilton, ibid. 
61 See E.R. Elhauge, ‘The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine’ (1992) 59 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 1465, 1503. 
62 ibid, 1503-23. Sepe, n 12 above, 17-18. 
63 Elhauge, ibid.  
64 eg DeBaun v First Western Bank & Trust Co., 120 Cal.Rptr. 354 (Cal.App. 1975). 
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This exception imposes a duty on the part of the incumbent controller to 
investigate the expected future conduct of an acquirer,65 where he has reason to 
suspect66 he might be a looter. If the suspicion persists after an investigation, he 
must abstain from selling his shares to this buyer, unless the other shareholders are 
offered an equal selling opportunity.67 In case of non-compliance with this rule, 
the seller will have to surrender the entire premium received and be liable for any 
damage caused to the remaining shareholders by the looter.68  
Although the level of scrutiny in these cases goes beyond a mere application 
of the duty of care (the business judgment rule does not apply),69 the exception 
has hardly had any practical relevance, which might be due to difficulties of 
proving that the seller had, or should have had, the suspicion necessary to trigger 
the duty.70 Notwithstanding the apparent lack of its enforcement, even this limited 
version of the sharing rule is subject to criticism. In the view of Easterbrook and 
Fischel, such a duty to investigate the buyer’s motivations equals ‘preventive 
detention of people who never have robbed banks, but have acquisitive 
personalities’.71 
The second exception concerns so-called ‘sale of office’-cases. Directors of 
US corporations usually have the power to appoint successors of board members 
resigning in between the annual shareholders’ meetings, without requiring them to 
obtain shareholder approval. As a general rule, a director, of course, may not 
accept payment in exchange for transferring his position as a director to another 
person.72 However, where a controlling shareholder sells his interest (shares) in the 
company, the buyer will regularly make the transaction conditional upon his 
nominees being appointed as directors, which can be achieved by seriatim 
resignation of the old, and appointment of the new directors. Any premium 
received in connection with the sale of the controller’s shares could therefore also 
be attributed to the seller’s promise to appoint the buyer’s nominees, therefore 
constituting an illegal sale-of-office.  
However, at least where a majority of shares is sold, the case law allows such 
contracts.73 Although it is less clear which rule applies to sales de facto, but not de 
jure controlling blocks of shares,74 it should be borne in mind that nothing 
                                                     
65 ie, in relation to the corporation (and the minority shareholders). 
66 The majority of cases impose such a conditional duty, triggered by circumstances that give rise to 
suspicion. The mere payment of a premium is not sufficient; see Elhauge, n 61 above, 1507, who 
advocates shifting to an affirmative duty instead. 
67 It is not entirely clear which level of knowledge or suspicion makes the sale of control unlawful. 
Knowledge and recklessness clearly suffice according to the case law, whereas it remains questionable 
what happens where the seller is negligent; Clark, n 40 above, §11.4.1, 479. 
68 As Elhauge, n 61 above, 1505, points out, this has ‘penal’ character, which can be justified by 
deterrence arguments. 
69 ibid, 1506. 
70 Clark, n 40 above, §11.4.1, 480. 
71 Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above, 719. 
72 Clark, n 40 above, §11.4.1, 480. 
73 Essex Universal Corp. v Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962); see also, Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above, 
722. 
74 Clark, n 40 above, §11.4.2.  
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prevents the parties from calling a general meeting to effect the relevant 
appointments. Thus, the rule does not seem to constitute a major deviation from 
the MR. 
The third exception involves what Clark calls diversions of ‘collective 
opportunities’.75 It is the exception that led to the famous decisions in Perlman v 
Feldmann76 and Jones v H.F. Ahmanson & Co.77 This exception leaves the greatest 
leeway for discussion of a sharing requirement in US corporate law. 
Although the exact meaning of the Feldmann case is subject to various 
interpretations,78 the practical impact appears to be rather small. Gilson and 
Gordon state that, although the case ‘continues to amuse corporate law teachers, 
[…] by the early 1990s, the applicable legal rule was radically different’.79 Similarly, 
the scope of application of the Ahmanson case also seems to be rather narrow. 
Apart from the indifference the controllers showed to a possibly detrimental effect 
on the minority shareholders, Traynor C.J. explicitly refers to the lack of a 
business purpose of the transaction.80 Especially this latter condition will not 
normally be satisfied in sale-of-control transactions. Overall, the facts of both 
cases are rather exceptional,81 and do not seem to have led to a general reversal, or 
even a substantial push-back, of the market rule’s general application. 
Elhauge argues that by either triggering the MR or the (quasi) MBR, US 
doctrine utilises the optimal rule depending on the given circumstances and is 
therefore superior to any one of the two rules.82 Absent any reported successful 
‘looting cases’,83 and with the other exceptions (at best) playing a minor role in US 
sale-of-control transactions, this seems to be an overly optimistic view. At least as 
far as looting cases are concerned, Clark’s suggestion that the little practical 
significance of the rule is rooted in difficulties to prove the necessary level of 
‘recklessness’ on the part of the seller84 appears to be more plausible. 
 
The Market Rule 
With the three exceptions described above playing a very limited role in practice, 
and certainly not amounting to a general sharing requirement, the rule normally 
applying to private sale-of-control transactions in the US is the market rule (MR). 
In general, the seller is thus free to transfer his controlling block to a potential 
                                                     
75 ibid, §11.4.3. 
76 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. Denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). 
77 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969). 
78 Clark, n 40 above, 492. 
79 R.J. Gilson and J.N. Gordon, ‘Controlling Controlling Shareholders’ (2003) 152 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 785, 793. 
80 460 P.2d 467; see, also, ibid, 490. 
81 See Clark, n 40 above, §11.4.3, 483-385 and 488-490, for a description. 
82 Elhauge, n 61 above, 1532. 
83 Clark, n 40 above, §11.4.1, 480. 
84 ibid. 
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buyer, without the requirement on his part,85 or on the part of the acquirer86 to let 
the remaining shareholders participate in his gains of the transaction. 
For the purposes of this paper, let us therefore define a MR as a legal 
framework that:  
 
(i) allows the incumbent controller to sell his shares together with the 
effective control over the company at any price he is able to achieve, 
without having to share the proceeds with his fellow shareholders (and/or 
the company); 
 
(ii) does not require the acquirer of the shares to offer to the remaining 
shareholders to buy the residual shares; and 
 
(iii) allows the acquirer to voluntarily make an offer for the residual shares, at 
any price he thinks fit, without any reference to the price he paid to the 
(former) blockholder. 
 
 
 
EFFICIENT SALE-OF-CONTROL TRANSACTIONS IN ONE-
BIDDER-SCENARIOS 
 
Having defined the two rules, this section will now proceed to the efficiency 
analysis of these two rules. First, an analytical framework will be presented along 
the lines of previous work in this field. Second, the notion of private benefits of 
control, central to the comparison of the two rules, will be critically examined. 
Thirdly, a few remarks on ‘efficiency’ are necessary to define the benchmark the 
two rules are tested against. 
Using these instruments, an assessment of efficiency costs of the MBR and 
the MR will be provided, focusing on the question whether one particular bidder (i) 
should acquire control (ie in terms of social optimality), and (ii) whether he can 
acquire control under the relevant legal framework. The results are generally in line 
with the extensive prior literature on this topic.87 
As no one rule is superior to the other in all circumstances, a few remarks 
regarding the real-life probability of the different scenarios will be provided.  
 
                                                     
85 This would be the route taken by the equal sharing school in the US. 
86 ie, the MBR-solution. 
87 See, esp, Bebchuk, n 28 above; Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above; M. Kahan, ‘Sales of 
Corporate Control’ (1993) 9 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 368; S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart, 
‘One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control’ (1988) 20 Journal of Financial Economics 175; 
M.C. Burkart and F. Panunzi, ‘Mandatory Bids, Squeeze-Out, Sell-Out and the Dynamics of the Tender 
Offer Process’ in G Ferrarini, et al, n 31 above, 748-753. 
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THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Let S be a shareholder with de facto-control of a company, holding a proportion of 
ϕ shares of this company with ϕ 0, 1. Let B be a potential buyer of the 
incumbent controller’s block of shares. 
Let CFS and CFB be the net present values (‘NPV’) of the future dividends of 
the company as a whole under the control of S and B, respectively.88 
Divergences between CFS and CFB can be rooted in differing abilities to 
manage or monitor the management of the company, differences regarding the 
allocation of available cash-flows between private benefits (‘PBCs’)89 and CFs 
(dividends), operating synergies90 and the like.91 
Let us further assume that S currently receives PBCs with a NPV of 	
, 
whereas B, after taking over control of the company, would be able to extract 
PBCs amounting to PBB, with  ,   0.92 
Let ∆PB and ∆ be the difference between B’s and S’s levels of PBCs and 
CFs, respectively, defined as ∆     and ∆    . The total 
aggregated value generated by the company for its shareholder body as a whole 
under S’s control therefore amounts to     . Likewise, the total value 
generated by the company under B’s control (ie after the transaction) would 
be 	    . 
Before proceeding with the efficiency analysis, a closer look at the meaning of 
PBCs in the context of takeovers seems necessary. 
 
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL 
 
It is widely recognised that a person exercising effective control over a company 
usually gets ‘something more than other shareholders of the company.93 In other 
                                                     
88 In other words, CF is the basis of the share’s fair value under B’s and S’s management, respectively; if a 
control transfer is not anticipated, or is not anticipated to have a value effect on the shares held by the 
minority shareholders, the company will have a market capitalisation of CF in an efficient market. All 
cash-flow rights equally shared among the shareholders are hereinafter referred to as ‘CFs’. 
89 PBCs are analysed immediately below. 
90 Bebchuk, n 28 above, 963. 
91 See further below. 
92 Negative PBCs, ie, aggregate ‘private-costs-of-control’, eg, arising from reputational concerns of a 
parent company (Holderness, n 7 above, 55), are left out for the purposes of this analysis. Where the 
incumbent controller has no or negative PBCs, the efficiency performance of the MBR and the MR does 
not differ (although distributional differences might persist). The same is true for the marginal case, 
where the incumbent controller has zero PBCs; in this case, the company does have a homogenous 
shareholder body, and the fact that it is the blockholder who takes the selling decision should not create 
different outcomes irrespective of the applicable rule. 
93 See ibid, 54; L.A. Bebchuk and M. Kahan, ‘A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy 
Contests’ (1990) 78 California Law Review 1071, 1090; R. La Porta, et al, ‘Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 3, 4; Grossman and Hart, n 87 above, 177; 
O. Ehrhardt and E. Nowak, Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation (or What Exactly are Private 
Benefits of Control?) (EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper No. 809, 2003) at ssrn.com/abstract=423506. As 
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words, the ability to control a company has a distinct (separate) value – over and 
above the sum of the cash-flow rights (CFs) attached to the shares conferring this 
control. 
The most obvious illustration for the separability of such ‘control bonuses’ 
from cash-flow rights shared among all shareholders is a situation where the 
incumbent controller does not (necessarily) possess any equity holding, but still 
exercises effective control; this is the case for managers confronted with an 
unorganised, widely-dispersed and apathetic shareholder body – the managers in a 
Berle-Means-company. Having the possibility to run the company in their own 
self-interest, rather than in the investor’s interest, the pure decision-making power 
vested in the managers has a certain value to them.94  
At first glance, this might look like the attempt to equate PBCs to ‘managerial 
agency costs’. However, managerial agency costs are the owners’ losses – the profits 
they forgo as a consequence of sub-optimal control of their assets. When looking at 
PBCs, however, we do not look at the owners’ losses (if any), but exclusively at the 
actual benefits received by the controller. Although a connection between these two 
values can (and often will) exist, it is important to keep the two concepts separated 
in the analysis.  
 
Defining Private Benefits of Control 
There is no single, generally accepted definition of PBCs.95 Grossman and Hart, 
for instance, define PBCs in the context of control transactions as ‘benefits 
current management or the acquirer obtain for themselves, but that the target 
securityholders do not obtain. These include synergy benefits [...], the return from 
being able to freezeout minority shareholders […]; perquisites of control, and in 
extreme cases the diversion of resources to the acquirer.’96 
Similarly, Bebchuk and Kahan97 as well as Coffee98 define them as benefits 
captured by the controllers, which are not shared pro rata with the other 
shareholders. Starting from this rather general definitions, PBCs are commonly 
further categorised. One common way of categorisation is to divide PBCs into 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary PBCs.99 Pecuniary PBCs are usually associated to some 
                                                                                                                                       
Davies, n 30 above, 13, points out, the higher per-share value of a controlling block is also acknowledged 
by UK case law: Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] A C 534, HL. 
94 See, also, M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 312; Grossman and Hart, ibid, 181; 
Kershaw, n 20 above, 268. 
95 See Ehrhardt and Nowak, n 93 above, for an overview of different approaches. 
96 n 87 above. 
97 Bebchuk and Kahan, n 93 above, 1090. 
98 J.C. Coffee, Jr, ‘Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation’ (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 2151, 2157. 
99 R.J. Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1641; Ehrhardt and Nowak, n 93 above, 8; H. Demsetz and K. 
Lehn, ‘The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences’ (1985) 93 Journal of Political 
Economy 1155, 1161-1162. 
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form of ‘tunneling’ or ‘stealing’100 of assets, albeit not necessarily being outright 
illegal in all circumstances.101 Pecuniary benefits have received much attention in 
corporate law scholarship, to a large extent as part of the theoretical underpinning 
of the ‘law matters’-thesis.102 Within this framework, they are often regarded as the 
materialisation of weak investor protection or property laws, enabling controllers 
of a company to misappropriate corporate assets through the employment of 
various mechanisms, and therefore providing him with an additional stream of 
income (rent).  
Non-pecuniary PBCs were already described by Jensen and Meckling,103 who 
use the attractiveness of the secretarial staff and charitable contributions as 
examples. Demsetz and Lehn also recognise the existence of non-pecuniary 
income, related to ‘the ability to deploy resources to suit one’s personal 
preferences’.104 Examples given are the ability to influence public opinion 
associated to control of mass media providers and the possibility to pursue 
emotional goals through professional sports clubs. 
However, calling such PBCs non-pecuniary is insofar misleading as these 
benefits are not necessarily or even typically ‘free’ (ie costless) to the company.105 
Similarly, non-pecuniary PBCs typically have a monetary value to the controller, as 
there will normally exist a ‘willingness to accept’ associated with these benefits. 
This is certainly true for most of the examples typically provided for non-
pecuniary PBCs, and only few situations will exist where this is not true.106 It 
follows that most non-pecuniary PBCs come at an opportunity cost for outside 
shareholders.107 Where the controller receives something, which has a monetary 
value to the controller and (often) a monetary cost to the company (ie the minority 
shareholders), the ‘non-pecuniary’-label seems somewhat misplaced. In most 
cases, the only justification for this terminology will be the form in which the 
controller receives the benefit. Unlike with pecuniary PBCs, non-pecuniary PBCs 
                                                     
100 See, eg, Gilson, ibid, 1672, describing laws against the extraction of pecuniary PBCs as a manifestation 
of ‘thou shalt not steal’. 
101 See S. Johnson, et al, ‘Tunneling’ (2000) 90 American Economic Review 22, 22-23, distinguishing between 
‘outright theft’, transfer-pricing, and the like, and value increases without assets transfers. They conclude 
that much of the tunneling is actually effected through the employment of legal (although ‘unfair’) 
dealings (26). See, also, A. Dyck and L. Zingales, ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International 
Comparison’ (2004) 59 Journal of Finance 537, 540. 
102 eg, R. La Porta, et al, n 93 above; particularly, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. 
Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113. See, also, Gilson, n 99 above, for an 
overview. 
103 n 94 above, 312. 
104 n 99 above, 1161-1162. 
105 See Gilson, n 99 above, 1667-1672; A.M. Pacces, ‘Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private 
Benefits of Control’ (Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics Working Paper No 2009/04, 2009) at 
ssrn.com/abstract=1448164, 7. 
106 See Gilson, ibid, 1665, describing a realistic trade-off scenario between ‘psychic benefits’ and an 
increase in monetary (family) wealth. 
107 See, also, Pacces, n 105 above, 8-9. 
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do not come in the form of money or something easily exchangeable (sold) for 
money.108 Clearly, these are not useful criteria for categorising PBCs. 
A complementary way sometimes used to categorise PBCs is to distinguish 
between dissipative and non-dissipative PBCs.109 Dissipative benefits, in this 
context, are PBCs which are mirrored by a loss on the part of the company, eg 
typical asset-siphoning; these are the cases where the minority shareholders 
(indirectly) pay for controller’s gain.110 Non-dissipative benefits, on the other hand 
are often equated to ‘psychic benefits’ derived from controlling the company.111 
Just as with non-pecuniary PBCs, it is often argued that their idiosyncratic nature 
makes them hard to transfer.112 In fact, the two categorisations are sometimes 
treated as being practically equivalent or at least closely related,113 with non-
pecuniary PBCs being equated to non-dissipative PBCs, and pecuniary and 
dissipative PBCs forming the second group. 
However, the division in dissipative and non-dissipative PBCs blurs the 
picture in so far as it implicitly tries to link PBC-extraction to outside shareholder 
wealth-effects. Yet, the costs for shareholders do not correspond to what is 
defined as PBCs. While PBCs correspond to the controller’s gains, in the context 
used here, their willingness to accept in order to surrender them (eg the ‘bribe’ 
necessary to make him resign), the investors’ corresponding losses (eg their 
willingness to pay for monitoring) can quite substantially differ from this value.114 
Investors’ losses can be far greater (which would be the case with empire-
building), equal (eg taking money from the company without wasting money on 
covering it up and still not be caught), or less (eg stealing something that is of 
higher value to the controller) than corresponding PBCs. Sometimes, there are no 
corresponding costs (eg psychic benefits purely derived from the decision-making 
power), or these are even ‘negative’ (ie benefits; this typically will be the case with 
synergies) for a certain level of PBCs. 
The distinction between pecuniary/non-pecuniary PBCs, on the other hand, 
is misleading in itself. Non-pecuniary PBCs often come at a cost for the company, 
and they always have a value (expressible in money) to the controller.115 The only 
                                                     
108 See Jensen and Meckling, n 94 above, 312, stating that the controller ‘will expend resources to the 
point where the marginal utility derived from a dollar’s expenditure of the firm’s resources on such items 
equals the marginal utility […] his share of the wealth reduction’. This shows that the benefit is able of 
valuation in money’s worth by the recipient. Also (implicitly), Dyck and Zingales, n 101 above, 540. 
109 Berglöf and Burkart, n 23 above, 192; J.C. Coates IV, ‘Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How 
Contestable Should EU Corporations Be?’ (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 11/2003, 2003) at 
ssrn.com/abstract=424720. See, also, Bebchuk, n 28 above, 979. 
110 eg, A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 737, 
759; Sepe, n 12 above, 10. 
111 Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above, 435; Dyck and Zingales, n 101 above, 540. 
112 Ehrhardt and Nowak, n 93 above, 7. 
113 ibid; see, also, Sepe, n 12 above, 10. 
114 See, also, Pacces, n 105 above, 12-13, showing how even psychic benefits have a ‘market value’ once it 
comes to an acquisition decision. 
115 This might have been the reason for the introduction of dissipative/non-dissipative benefits. 
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common non-pecuniary character of such PBCs is that they are received in a form 
that is not easy-to-liquidate.116 
 
Synergies as private benefits 
Synergy gains exist, where a certain combination of two assets (or firms) is worth 
more than the aggregate value of the two assets (firms) on a stand-alone basis.117 
The sources of such synergies are manifold; they can stem from operative 
efficiencies (economies of scope/economies of scale), better financing structures, 
or simply the ability to better manage the two companies.118 
Just like other PBCs, synergies increase the value of the controlling 
shareholder stock valuation as compared with the non-controlling members of the 
company. It seems plausible, therefore, to include synergies into the concept of 
PBCs. Indeed, synergies are often explicitly mentioned as examples for PBCs,119 
while others seem to assume that (pecuniary) PBCs are value reducing by 
definition.120 
A possible objection to defining synergies as PBCs could be that synergies, 
unlike other forms of PBCs, typically involve some kind of sharing between the 
parent and the subsidiary companies. However, it can easily be shown than any 
allocation of synergy gains between a parent and a subsidiary (apart from 
allocating all to the subsidiary) will leave the parent company with a higher 
proportion of the gains than any other shareholder of the subsidiary, thus 
increasing the parent’s valuation of the subsidiary’s shares above the value 
attributed to them by the non-controlling shareholders.121  
Interestingly, although often included in definitions of PBCs, synergies are 
often neglected subsequently, especially when it comes to empirical analyses of 
PBC-levels. One could almost get the impression that this may stem from the 
‘mislabeling’ of PBCs: non-pecuniary/non-dissipative PBCs are associated with 
‘psychic benefits’, and are therefore expected to be hard to transfer and hard to 
quantify.122 Pecuniary/dissipative PBCs, on the other hand, are associated with 
‘stealing’, and are expected to be easier to pass on.123 Thus, the argument seems to 
go, the observation of PBCs through transactions must be confined or at least 
dominated by Pecuniary/dissipative PBCs, which at the same time makes them a 
useful proxy for good law-bad law comparisons. 
                                                     
116 For a different categorisation of PBCs see Pacces, n 105 above. Pacces distinguishes between 
‘idiosyncratic’ PBCs, ‘distortionary’ PBCs, and ‘diversionary’ PBCs, and shows how these types of PBCs 
affect controller decision-making and ownership structure. 
117 See Romano, n 2 above, 125-129, for a detailed discussion of possible synergy gains. 
118 ibid.  
119 eg, Grossman and Hart, n 87 above, 177; Bebchuk, n 28 above, 967; Holderness, n 7 above, 55. 
120 D.K. Denis and J.J. Mcconnell, ‘International Corporate Governance’ (2003) 38 The Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 1, 24; similarly, Dyck and Zingales, n 101 above, 539. 
121 As the parent company enjoys the same CFs as other shareholders in the subsidiary plus 100% of the 
gains attributed to the parent. 
122 Dyck and Zingales, n 101 above, 540; Ehrhardt and Nowak, n 93 above, 7. 
123 Ehrhardt and Nowak, ibid, 9. 
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However, synergies do not naturally fit into any of the two categories.124 They 
are created without anyone losing (the ‘1+1 > 2’ -logic), just like non-dissipative 
PBCs, but certainly have a clear ‘pecuniary’ value, which can be liquidated or even 
come in the form of cash – a consequence of the somewhat misleading 
categorisation of PBCs. 
Numerous attempts have been made in order to measure the extent of PBCs 
enjoyed by controlling shareholders. It is inherently difficult to directly observe the 
level of PBCs for various reasons; most obviously, where extracting the PBCs is 
against the law, they necessarily are hard to observe – otherwise they would not be 
of any value.125 
There are two general methods of estimating PBCs: The first method analyses 
the price differences of shares carrying the same cash-flow rights, but different 
voting rights.126 This allows estimating the market-value of a vote. The main 
drawback of this method is its ‘geographical bias’; dual-class equity structures are 
not permitted in every country, and their use in countries where they are allowed 
differs widely.127 
The second method estimates the levels of PBCs by analysing sale-of-control 
transactions.128 Comparing the share price of a company after a sale-of-control 
transaction with the transaction value of a sale-of-control allows one to observe 
the different valuations of a company’s shares by the non-controlling and the 
controlling shareholders, respectively.129 Assuming the existence of an efficient 
stock market, the price differences observed can serve as an estimate for PBCs.130 
A commonly accepted drawback of this method is the relative rareness of control 
transaction.131 
It is important to note, however, that these methods measure both, synergies 
and other PBCs, although this is usually not properly accounted for. A prominent 
example can be found in the article by Dyck and Zingales.132 The assumptions 
made and the framework used to measure PBCs implicitly show an assumption 
that PBCs are the result of either undetected/unenforced illegal conduct, or are 
attributable to less-than-perfect investor protection rules. In fact, the study also 
measures synergies, as do all other studies based on observed block premia. This 
can be shown by the following example: 
 
                                                     
124 See, also, Pacces, n 105 above. 
125 See Dyck and Zingales, n 101 above, 538. 
126 eg, K. Rydqvist, ‘Takeover Bids and the Relative Prices of Shares that Differ in Their Voting Rights’ 
(1996) 20 Journal of Banking & Finance 1407; T. Nenova, ‘The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and 
Control: A Cross-Country Analysis’ (2003) 68 Journal of Financial Economics 325. 
127 Dyck and Zingales, n 101 above, 543. 
128 eg, ibid; see, also, M. Barclay and C.G. Holderness, ‘Private Benefits from Control of Public 
Corporations’ (1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 371. 
129 Dyck and Zingales, n 101 above, 543-544. 
130 ibid.  
131 ibid.  
132 ibid, 538-539. See, also, Pacces, n 105 above, 6, who similarly argues that empirical studies only 
measure pecuniary PBCs directly extracted from shareholder wealth. 
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Example 1: 
Let us assume S-plc and B-Ltd are two companies, whose assets are 
comprised of nothing but a single piece of land each. The two premises are 
situated in an urban area and are located immediately next to each other. They 
formerly constituted the two halves of a single football-field. S, the 
controlling shareholder of S-plc, holds 30% of the shares, with the rest of the 
shares being widely-held.  
B-Ltd is a fully-owned subsidiary of B.  
The two pieces of land are currently being used as farmland and as a 
stockyard by S-plc and B-Ltd, respectively. S-plc has a market capitalisation of 
100; this constitutes the NPV of the income generated through its farming 
operations. 
B-Ltd lets the stockyard for a rent income with a NPV of 120. 
As B finds out that a local football-club is interested in renting a training 
field, and he knows that the two pieces of land would be the club’s only 
feasible option, he decides to buy S-plc. He anticipates a rent with a NPV of 
300 for the entire football field, once the two halves can be used together, net 
of all costs. 
Entering into the negotiations, B realises that S, a passionate farmer, 
attaches a value of 20 to his ability to work on his own farmland, although he 
pays market prices for all products he eventually consumes and does a great 
job as a farmer. 
B assumes that he will have to divide the revenues from letting the 
football field 50:50 (150 each) between the two companies, as both premises 
have the same size. 
 
In the example above, a transaction would certainly be value increasing and 
desirable. Acting rationally, B and S will reach an agreement: B has a reservation 
price of 75 for S’s share-block, as he will earn dividends worth 45 150  0.3  
and his own land will appreciate by another 30. S makes a profit if he sells above 
50, as his shares have a market value of 30  100  0.3  and he derives PBCs of 
20. 
Even if the deal is made at just above 50, an analysis of the PBCs using the 
control-transaction model133 would indicate the existence of PBCs, as the purchase 
price would exceed the post-transaction share price of S-plc. It is worth noting 
that B, in this example, does not extract any value from S-plc other than the better 
use of his own land. Furthermore, any price between 30 and 75 would be rational 
outcomes even if S does not currently derive any PBCs. Thus, the control-
                                                     
133 Barclay and Holderness, n 128 above; Dyck and Zingales, n 101 above. 
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transaction method of estimating PBCs includes synergies in its estimations of 
PBCs. Likewise, they measure all non-pecuniary or ‘psychic’ benefits.134 
 
Summary 
All types of PBCs, including synergies, influence the differences between the non-
controlling and the controlling shareholders’ valuation of a company in the same 
way. Distinguishing between pecuniary and non-pecuniary PBCs is, therefore, not 
useful in the context of control transaction. For the purposes of this paper, the 
term PBC refers to any value a controller attaches to his shares (as measured by 
his willingness to accept), if and to the extent this value is not equally attributed to the 
shares by its non-controlling shareholders. 
 
SOME REMARKS ON EFFICIENCY MEASURES 
 
The analysis provided in this paper tries to identify the determinants for designing 
a rule applicable to private sales-of-control in order to create efficient results. The 
usual standard of desirability in corporate law is efficiency.135 This means that a 
rule is desirable if it maximises wealth for investors.136 
The two main efficiency measures that can be used in this context are Pareto-
efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. While the Pareto-test defines changes as 
efficient if someone profits from the change and no one is worse off,137 the 
Kaldor-Hicks test is satisfied whenever the aggregate gains from a change exceed 
the aggregate losses (potential Pareto efficient).138 This latter test is typically used 
when judging regulatory decisions.139 
There is no clear answer as to which test is preferable in the context of 
corporate control transactions.140 Prior work in this field (implicitly) uses Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency,141 although Easterbrook and Fischel also consider a rule creating 
Pareto-efficient results.142 The question is complicated by the fact that diversified 
                                                     
134 Dyck and Zingales, ibid, 542, argue that the ‘control premium’ method does not measure the value of 
non-pecuniary benefits. This is not entirely convincing, however. First, whenever the seller has any 
bargaining power (λ < 1, in Dyck and Zingales’ terminology), private benefits of the incumbent 
controller, including non-pecuniary benefits, influence the resulting price. Second, non-pecuniary private 
benefits, including so called ‘psychic benefits’, certainly influence the reservation price of the buyer of a 
controlling block, and are therefore reflected in the results, even where all bargaining power rests with the 
seller. 
135 Elhauge, n 61 above, 1497. 
136 eg, B. Black and R. Kraakman, ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1996) 109 Harvard Law 
Review 1911, 1920. Other constituencies are protected by separate regulation; see Clark, n 40 above, 
§1.2.3. 
137 Or, alternatively, in its strong form, requiring that everyone wins at least something. For a detailed 
analysis of the different available efficiency measures, see O. Zerbe, Economic Efficiency in Law and 
Economics (UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001). 
138 ibid, 6. 
139 E.R. Elhauge, ‘Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?’ (1991) 101 Yale 
Law Journal 31, 53. 
140 Elhauge, n 61 above, 1497. 
141 eg, Bebchuk, n 28 above; Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above. 
142 Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above, 715. 
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investors’ wealth does not primarily depend on the performance of a particular 
asset (and, thus, the gains arising from a specific transaction). It rather is the 
expected aggregate impact of a given rule on the value of a (typical) portfolio of 
assets that counts. A rule creating efficient results (only) by the Kaldor-Hicks 
standard can therefore be expected to lead to Pareto-efficient results on the 
portfolio or investor level, as long as no systematic bias exists.143 Where all 
investors are equally likely to be on the winner’s or loser’s side with regard to each 
single transaction, and provided that a rule maximises aggregate welfare, everyone 
would be better off in the long-run with statistical certainty. 
However, ensuring that no such systematic disadvantage exists is not a trivial 
exercise. Easterbrook and Fischel suggest that investors can avoid problems by 
not investing in firms dominated by non-listed companies.144 This is problematic 
per se, as investors following this advice would naturally increase the costs of 
capital for such firms, which – it could be argued – in turn would incentivise such 
companies to privately bargain for a sharing rule to maximise the revenue from 
floating the minority interest. Moreover, this argument can be extended to all 
controlled companies as it would always be more favourable ex ante to invest in the 
non-controlled parent than taking a minority position in the subsidiary unless the 
shares in the subsidiary sell at a discount. 
The analysis in this paper uses the Kaldor-Hicks test to assess the MBR’s and 
MR’s efficiency. This approach seems favourable for two reasons. First, it is 
commonly accepted that a MR (at least in its ‘pure form’) does not necessarily 
create Pareto-efficient results on the single-transaction level, as a MR allows for 
some inefficient transfers funded by the outside shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, a 
meaningful comparison of the two rules, going beyond a statement in favour of 
the Pareto-efficient MBR for ‘fairness reasons’ needs to consider whether one rule 
performs better in overall wealth creation (and, possibly, on the portfolio-level). 
Second, the rules analysed here are not the only available policy choices for 
regulating corporate control transactions. Where necessary, the superior rule in 
Kaldor-Hicks terms can, ex hypothesi, be adapted to yield Pareto-efficient results, as 
long as its outperformance does not depend on some people losing. Taking this into 
account, the Kaldor-Hicks performance is important, even where Pareto-efficiency 
is considered the preferable standard for policy choices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
143 See Easterbrook and Fischel, ibid, 714. 
144 ibid.  
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THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MARKET AND MANDATORY BID 
RULES IN ONE-BIDDER SCENARIOS 
 
SELLER’S CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFERRING SHARES 
 
Let us assume S and B enter into negotiations regarding an acquisition of S’s block 
of shares by B. Naturally, S will only agree to sell his shares to B if he receives a 
full compensation for his current income stream resulting from the ownership of 
the shares. It follows that S has a reservation price145 of, and therefore will only 
sell his shares for a price above: 
 
"#$  %   
 
In other words, for the transaction to go ahead, B has to offer S the whole NPV 
of the CFs distributed to S (%) plus the entire value of PBCs currently extracted 
by S  . This represents the relevant willingness to accept value for the seller. 
It is worth emphasising that S’s reservation price is the same for both, the MR and 
the MBR.146 As will be shown below, the price B is willing to pay for S’s shares, on 
the other hand, will differ depending on whether a MR or a MBR applies. 
 
The (in)efficiency of the Market Rule147 
Under the MR, a transfer of the controlling block will happen if, and only if, the 
following condition is met:148 
 
%   & %   
 
The right-hand side of this condition simply repeats the willingness to accept 
condition described above. As S can keep all of the consideration received for 
himself, a transfer will take place, if (and only if) B can offer S a price exceeding 
the current value of the shares in S’s hands.149 
The left-hand side of the condition represents B’s reservation price 
(willingness-to-pay). Under a market rule, B will be the owner of a proportion of 
shares in the target equal to % after successfully completing the transaction. As 
there is no requirement to purchase additional shares of the company, the 
                                                     
145 The reservation price is the price below (seller)/above (buyer) which a transaction loses its economic 
rationale for the respective party. 
146 The results do not change even where the MBR is substituted with a sharing rule imposed on the 
seller. In this case, the different (ie: higher) resulting reservation price of the seller is fully set-off by a 
lower reservation price for the bidder. 
147 The analysis offered here follows, in particular, the previous works of Bebchuk, n 28 above; Kahan, n 
86 above; and Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above. Regarding Kahan’s framework, an attempt has been 
made to simplify the transfer conditions without losing generality; see below. 
148 See Kahan, n 86 above, 371. The transfer condition is equivalent to Bebchuk’s proposition, although 
the approach taken here is based on entity values, rather than per-share values (Bebchuk, n 28 above, 
965). 
149 Provided that there are no rival bidders who could outbid B; we will return to this immediately below. 
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transaction will be profitable to him where he pays less than the post-transaction 
value of S’s share-block. His reservation price "'(   is therefore equivalent to 
the post-transaction value of S’s shares. 
 
"'(  %   
 
This value is formed analogous to S’s decision value (Pmin (S)) and consists of  
 
(i) the CFs which B expects to produce as a controller (CF+), adjusted for the 
percentage of shares (ϕ), and 
 
(ii) the PBCs which B expects to extract, once he acquires control (PB+). As 
he is able (by definition) to keep the entire PBC-value he generates (or 
extracts), he will value them at their full NPV (ie without adjustment 
for %). 
 
Differences between transfer and efficiency conditions 
A transfer of control is (Kaldor-Hicks) efficient if, and only if, the value generated 
by the company as a whole is higher post-transaction than before; in this case, any 
losing party could hypothetically be compensated without eroding all of the losses 
by the winners in the transaction. A transfer of control is therefore only efficient if 
the following condition is met:150 
 
   &    
 
In other words, the aggregate values of CFs and PBCs extracted by the controlling 
shareholder must be higher after the transaction than before. As can be seen 
above, the two conditions for the transfer of the controlling block and for the 
transfer’s efficiency differ. Whereas the former factors in the size of S’s 
shareholding (%), the latter (naturally) does not. 
Inefficient transfers under a Market Rule 
An inefficient transfer can take place under a MR if only the transfer condition, 
but not the efficiency condition is met, or, more technically, 
 
.	  		 & %  	 (transfer takes place) 
and 
	  		 /   	 (transfer is inefficient) 
 
The first condition simply restates the transfer condition given above, while the 
second is the negation of the efficiency condition. As ϕ represents the percentage 
                                                     
150 See Bebchuk, n 28 above, 963. 
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of shares that are for sale, and we defined % 0, 1, it can easily be seen that where 
S holds all shares %  1 , the transfer condition collapses to the equivalence of 
the efficiency condition, meaning that only efficient transfers can happen in these 
cases. 
Using the definitions for the two bidders’ differences regarding their 
respective abilities to create CFs and extract PBCs from above, the conditions can 
also be restated as: 
 
%   &     0  % ∆ & ∆  
(parties reach a bargain) 
and 
   /     0  ∆ / ∆   
(they do so although the transfer is inefficient) 
 
In other words, the model used here allows for the bidder, once he obtains 
control, to create value by increasing CFs, available to all shareholders (∆ & 0 , 
and/or by extracting more PBCs than the incumbent controller (∆ & 0 . 
Where the bidder is better in both, CF-generation and PBC-extraction, the 
transaction is necessarily efficient. For the transaction to be efficient, despite a 
decrease in one of the two categories, this decrease has to be fully made up for by a 
corresponding increase in the other category. This is expressed by the inefficiency 
condition above. 
In the transfer condition, however, a smaller weight is put on the generation 
of CFs.151 This means that a decrease in cash-flow rights only has to be 
compensated partly by an increase in PBCs, and vice versa. 
Combining the two conditions leads us to the conclusion that an inefficient 
transfer takes place under a MR, if, and only if 
 
 ∆ / ∆ / % ∆ 
 
Where B creates higher CFs, the transfer can therefore never take place and be 
inefficient at the same time.152 This can intuitively explained by the fact that B and 
S weigh CFs proportional to their shareholding, and thus no externalities can arise.  
Where B creates higher private cash-flows (PBCs), on the other hand, 
inefficient transfers are possible. Such a transfer takes place where B anticipates a 
decrease in dividends (as compared to S), but expects to be compensated through 
the extraction of PBCs. While the loss of dividends is borne by all shareholders, B 
only has to pay a part of this loss (equivalent to %). The bidder therefore can 
create negative externalities on the part of the minority shareholders.153 
                                                     
151 See Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above, 439, for a detailed analysis of the way the two rules 
‘weigh’ security and private benefits. 
152 For positive changes in the security value (∆), %∆ can never be greater than ∆. 
153 Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above, 714-715, suggest a rule requiring all minority shareholders to 
receive at least the pre-transaction market value to alleviate this problem. 
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Such a bidder is normally called a looter;154 bearing in mind the definition of 
PBCs given above,155 this is not always true. True, B could be a looter. He might 
simply appropriate assets, which otherwise would be available for pro rata-
distribution.156 With an equity holding of 50%, for instance, he would use as much 
as £1 to receive an extra 50p of private benefits.157 In fact, due to legal rules aimed 
at restricting asset-siphoning, such a ‘wasteful’ extraction might be necessary in 
order for the siphoning not being spotted by the other investors and the 
regulators.158 
However, equalising a post-transaction decrease of the share price with 
‘stealing’ implicitly assumes that the minority shareholders have property rights 
regarding the level of CFs generated under S’s control. This is certainly true (at 
least indirectly) in respect of the assets of the company, as almost every country in 
the world will have rules prohibiting the appropriation without compensation of 
the company’s property by the controller.159 As far as synergies are concerned, 
however, this must not always be true.  
 
Example 2: 
 
X-Air plc, an airline-operator, runs an airport-taxi business through a 
listed subsidiary, X-Taxi plc, the shares of which are held by X-Air plc (51%) 
and dispersed shareholders (49%). Under a licensing agreement with X-Air, 
X-Taxi uses the ‘X-Air’ brand name, and customers often choose X-Taxi 
because of X’s reputation (despite above-market prices). The consideration 
for using the brand name amounts to less than the additional revenues 
generated through the reputation effect.  
Upon expiry of the licensing agreement, X-Air decides to sell-off X-Taxi, 
eg because X-Air’s benefits (eg the increased customer loyalty) have 
substantially decreased in recent time. 
X-Air’s shares in X-Taxi are then sold to Y-Oil, a company running gas 
stations. Despite the anticipated lower future profits of X-Taxi (due to the 
loss of X-Air’s brand name), Y-Oil expects a lower volatility of its petrol 
sales, as it supplies X-Taxi with petrol (at market prices). As demand becomes 
more predictable for Y-Oil, it can sell one of its current fuel-storages. The 
cost savings amount to 75% of X-Taxi’s lost profit. 
 
It can hardly be argued that there is any illicit or unfairly prejudicial conduct 
involved in the above example by either of the involved parties. Nevertheless, 
                                                     
154 Jennings, n 15 above, 42. 
155 See text to n 117 above. 
156 Johnson, et al, n 101 above. 
157 Jensen and Meckling, n 94 above, 312. 
158 La Porta, et al, n 93 above, 6, using the costs for setting-up intermediary companies as an example. 
159 Johnson, et al, n 101 above, 22-23. 
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following the transfer, the share price of X-Taxi will decline without any of the 
contracting parties taking the entire lost value into consideration when making the 
investment decision. The example shows how the loss of synergies can operate as 
an externality against which shareholders are not protected. Claims that inefficient 
sales-of-control under a MR can (fully) be prevented by more targeted rules aimed 
at investor protection160 typically neglect this part of the problem. This also means 
that the fiduciary obligation to share profits from a sale-of-control to ‘looters’161 
could not even prevent all inefficient transactions, where their enforcement works 
perfectly. 
 
Prevented efficient transfers under a Market Rule 
A second source of inefficiencies arises, where efficient (desirable) transactions are 
prevented from happening under a specific rule. Analogous to above, the market 
rule prevents efficient transactions if, and only if 
 
%   /     0  % ∆ / ∆  
(parties do not contract) 
and 
   &     0  ∆ & ∆   
(although transfer is efficient) 
 
or, alternatively: 
%∆ / ∆ / ∆ 
 
Two things can be derived from this statement of the inefficiency condition. First, 
the MR allows all transfers, where CFs and PBCs increase as a consequence of the 
control shift.162 Second, efficient transfers will only be blocked under a MR, where 
B extracts less PBCs than S.163 
Less technical, a transfer of control will not happen, where the higher future 
dividends after the transaction do ‘compensate’ for the losses in PBC-extraction on 
an entity-basis. However, the bidder cannot fully reap these profits, as he owns 
only a portion of % / 1 of the shares. The remaining shareholders are, from B’s 
viewpoint, a ‘profit leak’, making the transaction unprofitable. 
Turning back to Example 1 above, this could be the case where B uses 
currently gets 145 from using his land, and therefore experiences a smaller synergy 
(PBC) through the transaction. Although the transaction would still be efficient 
(∆  50; 20 2 ∆ / 15 , a transfer could not happen, as B offers less 
than 50 5  150  0.3 , while S needs to be offered at least 50. 
As Bebchuk points out, S will not normally be able to overcome this problem 
by buying out the remaining shareholders based on the present securities value and 
                                                     
160 eg, Jennings, n 15 above, 43. 
161 See text to n 64 above. 
162 With ∆, ∆ > 0,  %∆ / ∆ cannot be true. 
163 For ∆ < 0,  %∆ / ∆ cannot be true. 
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consequently sell the 100%-stake to B, primarily for free-rider problems.164 In the 
absence of a freeze-out rule allowing S or B to force the shareholders to sell their 
shares at a value below the post-transaction share value, such transactions are 
therefore prevented by the MR. 
 
THE (IN)EFFICIENCY OF THE MANDATORY BID RULE 
 
As stated above, in the presence of a MBR, S will sell his shares under exactly the 
same conditions as in the presence of a MR. Differences exist, however, regarding 
B’s willingness-to-pay. Confronted with a legal obligation to offer all remaining 
shareholders the same price as S, the maximum price B is ready to pay needs to 
factor in the expected costs for the mandatory bid. 
Under a MBR, a sale-of-control happens if, and only if 
 
%  % &   % 0 		  	 &
	
.
  
 
The right-hand side of the first inequality restates the transfer condition for S. The 
left-hand side represents the reservation price of B. It can be seen that, unlike in 
an MR-environment, B cannot pay for S’s shares using his entire CF-potential. 
Instead, the maximum price he can offer to S reflects his inherent sharing 
obligation, by paying S a maximum of his share (%) of the company’s post-
transaction value.165 
 
No inefficient transfers under the Mandatory Bid Rule 
It can easily be shown, that inefficient control transfers cannot happen under a 
MBR. This can be intuitively derived from the fact that the per-share value for S 
always at least equals the per-share values of the remaining shareholders.166 As B 
has to offer the same price he paid S to all remaining shareholders, the rational 
decision of B leads to all remaining shareholders also to be offered a price above 
their current share-values: 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
164 Bebchuk, n 28 above, 966-967; see, also, Grossman and Hart, n 8 above; L.A. Bebchuk and O.D. 
Hart, ‘Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control’ Harvard Law and 
Economics Discussion Paper No 336 at: ssrn.com/abstract=290584. 
165 Kahan, n 86 above, 371, splits the transfer requirement according to the other shareholders’ expected 
acceptance of the mandatory bid (Proposition 3). It seems, however, that such split is unnecessary, as the 
maximum price B is willing to pay always at least equals the post-transaction share price (for PB+ & 0). It 
follows that, whenever a transfer is possible under the MBR, B can make the other shareholders accept 
his offer without turning an otherwise profitable transaction unprofitable. See, also, Bebchuk, ibid, 973. 
166 ie, PB+  0. 
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   /    (inefficiency), and  
   &
34
5
  (transfer),  
we derive: 
34
5
  /    0
	
.
/ 	  
 
This condition for inefficient transfers can never be met, for any % 2 1, 6 & 0. 
 
The ‘private benefits hurdle’ 
Whereas inefficient transfers cannot proceed under a MBR, some efficient 
transfers are blocked. Efficient transfers are prevented in an MBR-environment if, 
and only if,  
 
   &    0 ∆	 / ∆ (transfer would be efficient),  
and 
   /
34
5
  0 ∆ /
	
.
 		 (transfer does not happen) 
 
It follows that efficient transfers are blocked by the MBR, if, and only if,167 
 
∆ / ∆ /

%
  
 
In other words, for (efficient) transfers to happen under a MBR, B needs to create 
efficiency gains that allow him to buy out all shareholders at a price equal to what 
he pays S. This requires him to pay multiple times for S’s PBCs, expressed by 
	
.
. 
It is this multiplying effect that lets the MBR prevent more efficient takeovers than 
the MR. The MBR therefore compensates the minority shareholders for 
something they do not currently enjoy (PBCs). 
Turning back to Example 1, this would be the case where B currently earns 
more than 133.3 with his piece of land, thus shrinking his PBCs to a value lesser 
than 16.7; note that this requires more PBCs than the equivalent problem with the 
MR (5). Thus, a MBR prevents more efficient transfers than the MR.168  
 
AGGREGATE COSTS OF THE RULES IN A ONE-BIDDER SCENARIO 
 
From the description above it can be seen that the MBR prevents more inefficient 
control transfers than the MR, while the MR allows some inefficient transfers to 
happen.169 In order to calculate the aggregate efficiency costs associated with the 
two rules, one would need to observe the likelihood of the relevant situations.  
                                                     
167 See Bebchuk, n 28 above, 971 (Corollary 5), and Kahan, n 86 above, 373 (Proposition 6). 
168 Bebchuk, ibid, 971. 
169 See above; this is in line with ibid, 960; Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above; Burkart and 
Panunzi, n 87 above, 752. 
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To this end, Bebchuk tries to estimate the probabilities of efficient bidders 
not being able to take control over the target under both rules, and an inefficient 
bidder succeeding under a MR.170 Bebchuk’s results depend on the distribution of 
PBCs and CFs among potential bidders and point to an advantage of the MR 
under most of the realistic assumptions he makes. 
It has to be taken into account, however, that this statistical analysis implicitly 
simulates offers by random potential bidders – one at a time – and aggregates the 
efficiency results of these hypothetical transactions by ‘counting’ the successful 
and unsuccessful bidders under each rule, depending on the efficiency or 
inefficiency of them taking control. Doing so, Bebchuks’s estimate effectively 
gives an idea of the proportion of potential bidders meeting the efficiency and the 
transfer requirements under the MR and the MBR. 
Although this is a useful starting point to identify the conditions under which 
one of the two rules is superior, it has to be borne in mind that this ‘binary’ 
approach (ie counting whether a bidder is successful or not) does not provide a 
complete estimate of the real inefficiency costs entailed by the two rules. The 
probability of no bidder meeting the transfer requirements of the MBR, however, 
depends inter alia on the number of interested buyers for a specific company and 
the variance between these bidders.171 
As will be shown below, the MBR has a positive screening function among all 
efficient bidders. Thus it is suggested here that in circumstances where some 
bidders can take control over the target under both rules, the MBR has additional 
advantages over the MR that need to be taken into account. 
Another argument against the MBR’s merits is based on the notion that PBC-
levels between two bidders are likely to be very similar, as they depend on the legal 
rules applicable to the target company.172 By also accounting for potential 
synergies, the analysis presented here takes away some of the force of this 
argument, because PBCs are not a mere function of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ law. 
Moreover, Dyck and Zingales find that the level of PBCs also depends on the 
origin of the bidder,173 potentially giving bidders from certain countries a 
systematic advantage in PBC-levels (but most likely not in CF-levels). Finally, the 
claim that the MBR leads to higher ownership concentration as incumbent 
controllers fear to be deprived of their PBCs by a hostile bidder, thus reducing 
contestability of control,174 seems unconvincing. Apart from the unlikeliness of 
hostile bids in block-holder companies,175 consolidation of control actually increases 
                                                     
170 Bebchuk, n 28 above, 974-981. 
171 ibid. 
172 eg, Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above, 447. 
173 Dyck and Zingales, n 101 above, 563. 
174 Sepe, n 12 above, 29. 
175 eg, Berglöf and Burkart, n 23 above, 176-177, who show that in the mainly blockholder-dominated 
Continental European countries hostile takeovers are very rare. 
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contestability of control under both rules, as a larger proportion of PBCs is 
internalised by a controller holding a large equity stake.176 
It remains to be said that estimating the efficiency costs of the two rules is a 
difficult task, as many different factors play a role. More empirical work needs to 
be done in order to correctly assess the likelihood of one rule’s outperformance. 
 
 
 
PRIVATE CONTROL AUCTIONS 
 
The analysis provided so far only deals with scenarios where one potential bidder, 
B, enters into negotiations with S to buy his controlling block. It is unlikely 
however, that S simply engage in exclusive negotiations with B. A controlling 
block in a listed company typically represents a significant investment; S will 
therefore rationally use considerable resources in order to find the ‘right’ acquirer 
for his shares. 
This search for the bidder will often be carried out through an auction,177 or 
an informal procedure expected to lead to the same result – identifying the bidder 
with the highest willingness-to-pay.178 As non-controlling shareholders of the 
target will not normally have a say in the procedure, the ‘auction’ will be decided 
based solely on the purchase price for B’s shares. This section examines the MR 
and the MBR in such ‘control auctions’. 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Building on the framework provided above, let us assume that B is not the only 
bidder in the auction. There exist two bidders 7; 8 ,179 both interested in 
buying S’s shares. The bidders differ in both 7;8 and 7;8. 
Let us further assume that S will choose to sell to the bidder offering him the 
highest price for S’s control block, if he exceeds S’s reservation price. 
 
SECOND-BEST OUTCOMES IN PRIVATE AUCTIONS UNDER THE MARKET RULE 
 
Under a MR, S will sell his shares under the same transfer condition as stated 
before. Accordingly, a bidder 7;8  will be able to purchase the controlling block, 
if, and only if, 
                                                     
176 See P.L. Davies, E.P. Schuster, and E. van de Walle de Ghelcke, n 7 above, 14-15. 
177 See J. Bulow and P. Klemperer, ‘Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?’ (2009) 99 American 
Economic Review 1544, analysing in detail the optimal design of a selling procedure to maximise sellers’ 
revenue. See, also, A.L. Boone and H.J. Mulherin, ‘Do Auctions Induce a Winner’s Curse? New Evidence 
From the Corporate Takeover Market’ (2008) 89 Journal of Financial Economics 1; A.L. Boone and H.J. 
Mulherin, ‘How are Firms Sold?’ (2007) 62 Journal of Finance 847-875.. 
178 Provided that the offers exceed B’s reservation value. 
179 The same applies to any auction with n bidders. 
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%7;8  7;8 & %   
and 
%7;8  7;8 & %8;7  8;7 
 
The second condition simply requires one bidder’s price to be higher than the 
other’s. Analogous to the inefficiencies associated to the MR in one-bidder 
scenarios, inefficiencies can result where the winning bidder is not, at the same 
time, the most efficient bidder.  
To examine whether the highest bid is placed by the more efficient bidder, 
one has to examine the two price functions and the efficiency condition. 
Inefficiency costs arise, if, and only if: 
 
%7  7 / %8  8(B1 loses the auction) 
and  
        7  7 & 8  8 (B1 creates more value) 
 
If we compare the two bidders using 9 7  8  and 9	 8 
7  as the differences in value creation between B1 and B2, regarding PBCs and 
future dividends, respectively, we derive 
 
%: / : /  : 
 
As above, inefficiencies are therefore created, where the more efficient bidder 
creates a larger proportion of his gains in terms of security values, rather than 
PBCs. In other words, for every £ of PBCs extracted by the less efficient, which is 
not equally extracted by the more efficient bidder, the latter has to earn the higher 
value of  
£
φ
 in additional security benefits. 
Turning back to Example 1 from above, let us assume B1 (ie B, controlling B-
Ltd) competes with B2 over S’s control block. Let us further assume that B2 (who 
wants to use the land as a landfill) can extract PBCs of 70 by running the company 
(eg the cost-savings from disposing his industrial waste closer to his factory), and 
that he intends to pay a rent to B-plc, which equals the revenues of the farming 
business. The auction situation can be illustrated as follows: 
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Despite B1 creating a higher value overall, B2 will still be able to outbid him, due to 
his PBC-advantage. The MR, therefore, creates second-best results in bidder 
auctions, where differences exist between the participants regarding their PBC-
levels, and these cannot be counterbalanced by higher CFs. 
Such situations create additional efficiency costs of the MR: whenever a 
controlling block is for sale, the MR skews the competition towards the bidder 
creating a larger proportion of the gains in PBCs, rather than letting the most 
efficient bidder win; among two parties creating the same overall value surplus, a 
MR will always lead to the bidder with the higher PBC-value winning the 
auction.180 It can also be shown that the parties involved (S;B1;B2) cannot resolve 
this ‘dilemma’ through bargaining amongst themselves.181 
Note that in this example, both bidders actually create values; this is not 
necessarily the case. As described above, the MR also allows some inefficient 
transactions to happen. In such situations, even an inefficient bidder can outbid a 
value-creating one. 
 
CONTROL AUCTIONS UNDER A MANDATORY BID RULE 
 
Under a MBR, the same problems do not exist. This logically follows from the 
MBR’s ability to block all inefficient transactions. B2, being the less efficient 
bidder, could never purchase the block from B1. It follows that B1 must have a 
higher reservation price than B2 under a MBR.  
More formally, under a MBR, a less value-creating bidder will win the auction 
if, and only if, 
 
%7  %7 / %8  %8 0 	<  		< / 	=  		= 
and  
	<  		< & 	=  		= 
 
These reverse conditions can self-evidently never be fulfilled. 
In other words, the MBR requires every bidder to weigh PBCs and cash-
flow rights equally, as does the efficiency condition. Between any two bidders, it is 
therefore always the most value-creating who wins the auction, irrespective of how 
the gains are distributed between PBCs and CFs. Turning back to Example 1, as 
modified above,182 the same ‘bidder contest’ would look as follows: 
                                                     
180 A similar conclusion drawn by Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above, 440, for tender offers, 
based on Grossman and Hart, n 87 above, is addressed further below. 
181 We will return to this point further below. 
182 See text to n 133 above. 
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As stated above, the equal weight given to CFs and PBCs leads to the most 
efficient bidder always winning the auction. 
 
Conditions for the MBR’s outperformance 
To be sure, the inefficiencies attached to the MBR still remain the same. In one-
bidder, as well as in multi-bidder scenarios, it is possible that no bidder can jump 
over the ‘PBC-hurdle’ under a MBR. Although this is also true for the MR, the 
extent to which this applies is greater in an MBR-environment.183 A pre-condition 
for the MBR’s outperformance therefore is a situation where at least one bidder 
creates enough gains to allow a transfer under the MBR. In addition, where the 
differences between the bidders are sufficiently large (: / φ: , the most 
efficient bidder will win the auction under any of the two rules. 
The MBR therefore performs better in control auctions, than the MR, if, and 
only if, 
 
: & φ : and  % ∆ / ∆ / ∆ 
 
These conditions represent the skewness of the MR towards the bidder with the 
highest PBCs. Adding this feature to the efficiency analysis of the MBR also 
means that the mere fact of aggregate abnormal returns following control 
transfers184 cannot be equalled to a better aggregate performance of the MR.185 
Transfers being efficient in aggregate does not per se mean that the MR is superior 
to the MBR, as forgone efficiency losses are not taken into account by that view. 
Furthermore, the analysis presented here, showing a better performance of 
the MBR in multi-bidder scenarios is somewhat contrary to Bebchuk’s results.186 
The differences can be explained as follows: Bebchuk assumes an indefinite 
number of rounds, with random bidders taking over control of the company.187 In 
such a situation, the MBR can, indeed, underperform, if a high-PBCs/low-CF 
bidder acquires control and no subsequent bidder meets the transfer conditions 
after that. However, the view presented here differs in so far as – maybe more 
realistically – the person acquiring control already needs to outbid his competitors 
                                                     
183 See text to n 167 above. 
184 Holderness, n 7 above, 54-55. 
185 This conclusion is drawn, eg, by Berglöf and Burkart, n 23 above, 198. 
186 Bebchuk, n 28 above, 980, testing multiple/infinite rounds of control changes. 
187 ibid. 
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in the ‘first round’. Assuming that not random, but the most suitable, bidders will 
participate in the auction, the MBR leads to the first-best result in this one auction. 
 
Distribution of transaction gains 
The outperformance of the MBR described above is dependent on the levels of 
PBCs created by the two bidders. It has been argued that a MBR, while indirectly 
preventing asset-siphoning to some extent, a more targeted approach, directly 
addressing ‘looting’ would be preferable.188 As showed above, inefficiency costs of 
the MR can exist even in the absence of any illegal or immoral ‘looting’, as the 
relevant PBC-levels are to be determined taking into account synergies by the 
parties involved. 
Even where investor protection laws actually deter ‘looting’ effectively, and 
no illegal PBCs can be extracted, the described advantages of the MBR would still 
persist in most cases. Where the takeover gains of the different potential bidders 
stem from different sources, ie one bidder expects to create disproportionally 
more value through the extraction of PBCs, while another bidder’s gains stem 
from increasing shared cash-flows to a larger extent, the MBR – by taking an equal 
weight on both types of gains – favours the best bidder, unless company law 
would demand that synergy gains are always assigned entirely to the target 
company. In  this case, the synergies from a transaction only benefit the target 
company, so they no longer constitute PBCs. Thus, they would not influence the 
acquirer’s and seller’s behaviour in the way described above, and the differences 
between the two rules would disappear.  
Even in case the gains of all bidders are distributed identically between PBCs 
and CFs189 – which does not seem to be a very realistic assumption per se – the 
MBR’s advantages would still exist unless company law provides for a fixed 
distribution key for synergy gains, determining the proportion of the gain to be 
assigned to the target company and the parent company, respectively. 
Both qualifications, however, are certainly not true. There exists no 
agreement among lawyers (nor among economists) giving a general answer on 
how to divide gains from transactions between a parent and a subsidiary 
company,190 and few (or no one) would argue that the parent company or acquirer 
must not enter into a mutually beneficial transaction with the target company 
unless all gains are assigned to the latter. 
 
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY MERGERS AND THE DIVISION OF GAINS 
 
Parent-subsidiary mergers should generally follow the same rules regarding the 
sharing of synergies as outright self-dealing.191 Where systematic differences exist, 
the parent company could arbitrarily exploit them by always choosing the 
                                                     
188 Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above, 719. Javaras, n 40 above; Jennings, n 15 above, 47. 
189 Meaning that each bidder’s PBCs are set at a fixed percentage of his CFs. 
190 Clark, n 40 above, §11.3. 
191 Grossman and Hart, n 87 above, 195. 
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mechanisms allocating the bigger share of the gain to itself, as both mechanisms 
have the common result of transferring assets between the two entities.192 Looking 
at parent-subsidiary mergers can therefore show whether all types of synergy gains 
are shared in the same manner in parent-subsidiary transactions. 
 
US 
In the US, the question of how to divide synergies between in a parent-subsidiary 
merger cannot be answered clearly.193 Although it is clear that shareholders are 
entitled to the pre-merger value of their shares,194 there is surprisingly little 
guidance beyond that.  
In Delaware, parent-subsidiary transactions are subject to an ‘entire fairness 
test’,195 but this does not really help, as the question of what ‘fairness’ means 
remains unanswered. From the legal literature, Brudney and Chirelstein, for 
instance, suggest dividing synergies according to the size of the respective 
companies.196 They do so by analogy to a trustee holding multiple accounts, in 
which case they assume he has to create proportionate sharing. The appeal of this 
solution is evident – the alternatives are a 50:50-sharing rule, which obviously 
would be subject to criticism due to its arbitrary nature, and a ‘real’ arms’ length 
rule. The latter would require ‘simulating’ a bargain between two unrelated parties, 
which is doctrinally convincing, but restates, rather than answers, the question. A 
share-by-size requirement, however, is equally arbitrary, and definitely falls far short 
of mirroring a bargain of unrelated parties.197  
Others argue that there should be no sharing requirement at all, basically for 
the same reasons why the MBR is rejected.198 However, the fairness-test (which 
can partly be substituted by disinterested board approval) guarantees the minority 
that a transaction proceeds ‘on terms similar to those that might be expected of a 
transaction between willing buyers and sellers’.199  
On the empirical side, Slovin has shown significant abnormal returns for 
minority shareholders following the announcement of parent-subsidiary mergers, 
indicating that parents do share some of the gains, to an extent comparable to 
                                                     
192 See, also, Gilson and Gordon, n 79 above, regarding the equivalence of different PBC-extraction 
mechanisms. 
193 Clark, n 40 above, §11.3, 473-474. 
194 This is to say, no compulsory sharing; see Alcott v Hymann, 208 A.2d 501 (Del.1965), Allied Chemical 
and Dye Corp v Steel Tube Co 120 A.486 (Del.Ch.1923). 
195 Z. Goshen, ‘The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality’ (2003) 91 
California Law Review 393, 396-439. 
196 V. Brudney and M. Chirelstein, ‘Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers’ (1974) 88 Harvard 
Law Review 297. 
197 This would be equivalent to saying that an individual contracting with a third party would make his 
demands conditional upon the net-wealth of the third party. 
198 Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above. 
199 Goshen, n 195 above, 403. 
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third-party transactions.200 The results vary widely, however, with the two inner 
quartiles ranging between 5.8% and 23.5%. 
 
Germany 
Similarly, no explicit legal rules exist in Germany.201 The prevalent view for share-
for-share mergers favours a share-exchange-ratio based on the relative standalone 
values;202 this leads, in effect, to the solution suggested by Brudney and 
Chirelstein.203 On the other hand, squeeze-outs are often argued not to require any 
synergy sharing,204 which obviously is inconsistent. 
For self-dealing transactions, the German rules require a strict at-arms’-length 
test, looking at the market value of the goods exchanged. Referencing to the 
market value already shows that some sharing will typically be required, as this is 
the expected result of arm’s-length-bargains. 
 
UK 
In the UK, transactions between the parent and the subsidiary are primarily205 
constrained by the listing rules regarding related-party-transactions.206 These rules 
require disinterested shareholder approval for most transactions between the 
parent and the subsidiary, effectively giving the minority the last say.207 An 
alternative remedy for minority shareholders, triggered by conduct constituting 
‘unfair prejudice’ by the majority shareholder,208 has not proved to be very 
effective, in contrast.209 More importantly, the appraisal usually awarded to 
successful shareholders,210 does not properly address the problem described 
here.211 
The disinterested shareholder approval-rule can be expected to lead to an at-
arm’s-length bargain, provided that the minority shareholders are not entirely 
passive. The strong presence of institutional investors could play a role in this 
                                                     
200 M. Slovin, ‘The Economics of Parent-Subsidiary Mergers: An Empirical Analysis’ (1998) 49 Journal of 
Financial Economics 255, 265. 
201 M. Winner, Wert und Preis im Zivilrecht (Vienna: Springer, 2008) 443. 
202 eg, M. Lutter and T. Drygala in M. Lutter (ed) Kommentar zum Umwandlungsgesetz (Cologne: Otto 
Schmidt, 2004) § 5 No 31; see the overview given by Winner, ibid, 453. 
203 Brudney and Chirelstein, n 196 above. 
204 eg, U Hüffer, Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (Munich: Beck, 7th ed, 2006) §305 No 22; but see, also, the 
opposite view expressed by Winner, n 201 above, 443. 
205 For the role of corporate opportunities-regulation, see D. Kershaw, ‘Lost in Translation: Corporate 
Opportunities in Comparative Perspective’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 603, comparing the UK 
rules to the allegedly more flexible US-regulation. 
206 UKLA Listing Rules, LR.11. 
207 See Goshen, n 195 above, for a detailed comparison of the different strategies used to restrict self-
dealing. LR.11 goes far beyond the general concept of self-dealing in the CA 2006: see Davies, n 13 
above, ch 16-55. 
208 s 994 CA 2006. 
209 Goshen, n 195 above, 430; Jennings, n 15 above, 43. 
210 Davies, n 13 above, ch 20-18. 
211 Clark, n 40 above, §12.2, 508. 
                08/2010 
 
 38
regard.212 Moreover, where creditors are affected, they also can enforce the arm’s-
length standard.213 
 
Transferring gains 
Apart from these legal uncertainties, some synergy gains are hard to transfer under 
any legal regime. Turning back to Example 1 from above, it would probably be 
very hard to argue that B, after taking control of S, first rents S’s land for 100, and 
then sub-lets it to the football club for 150. Minority shareholders would probably 
not have great difficulties to show in court that this is ‘unfair’. 
This, however, would equal the transaction B2 has in mind. By only making 
all shareholders as well off as they are now, he is not sharing any of the gains he 
creates. At the same time, minority shareholders will have a hard time showing 
that a contract at the same terms as formerly concluded with an unrelated third 
party is unfair to them. 
Similarly, synergies founded in the better management capabilities of the 
acquirer are also hard to transfer to the parent company. Such a transfer would 
require the new manager to receive all of the gains he produces as compensation 
for his services; independent directors would probably have a hard time justifying 
such a contract.214 
 
Summary 
Sharing of gains does not seem to be explicitly addressed in the regulation of 
parent-subsidiary regulation. Some gains are hard to transfer between two 
companies without the threat of legal action.  
Most legal systems probably provide some kind of assurance to the 
subsidiary’s minority shareholders which requires the parent company to bargain 
‘at-arm’s-length’. This means, however, that gains derived from different transactions 
will result in different allocations of gains, just as in the market place. The arm’s-
length-requirement common to most legal systems also means that the less 
comparable a certain type of transaction is, the greater the bandwidth of possible 
transactions. It is clear, however, that none of the rules described above even 
comes close to a mandatory ‘target gets all’ distribution of synergies. This is hardly 
surprising, as such a rule would offer less incentive to create such gains in the first 
place.215 
                                                     
212 Goshen, n 195 above, 429. 
213 D. Kershaw, ‘Involuntary Creditors and the Case for Accounting-Based Distribution Regulation’ 
(2009) Journal of Business Law 140, 155. 
214 But see R.S. Thomas, ‘Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?’ 
(2004) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 1171, 1200, who suggests that managers can capture all additional benefits 
(within the marginal revenue product-theory). 
215 Some incentives would still exist, however, as the acquirer still indirectly benefits from the gains 
assigned to the target company in his capacity as the target’s main shareholder.  
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For the analysis provided here, this means that even (or: especially)216 in 
countries with high investor protection, the division of gains between a parent and 
a subsidiary depends on various external factors, including the transferability of 
gains, the existence of a market for comparable transactions, and the division of 
gains between unrelated parties in this market. Since synergy gains do not have to 
be assigned exclusively to the target company and the parent company (or the 
acquirer) may keep some of the gains, this also means that they, in fact, are PBCs 
as argued above.  
This analysis is certainly not complete; it shows, however, that the same level 
of overall gains can lead to substantially different distributional results. As showed 
above, such differences can have implications for allocative efficiency. 
 
CAN THE MARKET RESOLVE THE PROBLEM? 
 
As showed above, the MR allows more efficient control transfers to happen than 
the MBR; on the other hand, it also allows some inefficient transfers, which are 
blocked under the MBR.217 In addition, the MR creates second-best outcomes in 
some private auctions of control-blocks, by failing to favour the most efficient 
bidder in taking control. The MBR, in contrast, does have such an efficiency-
screening function and leads to the best (or, sometimes inefficiently, none) of the 
bidders gaining control. 
A possible objection to this analysis could assert that the bidder able to create 
the highest overall welfare gain (B1) will nevertheless be able to bargain with the 
other parties to achieve this goal. Two scenarios are possible to achieve that. First, 
B1 and the non-controlling shareholders could compensate the B2 for 
withdrawing his offer, therefore letting the best-bidder’s offer prevail. 
Depending on the value the control block has for S, the B1 will often even be 
able to achieve that on his own, where he has some spare resources arising from 
differences in "#$>  and "'(+7 . In effect, this would be a simple re-allocation 
of the purchase price by the most efficient bidder; instead of offering "'(+7  to 
S,218  he could allocate part of the difference between his highest price and the S’s 
reservation value to B2 as a consideration for leaving the auction.219 Similarly, the 
minority shareholder could contribute their part of +7  +8 to the bribe. 
                                                     
216 Arguably, in countries with only minimal investor protection, the parent would extract gains up to the 
point that can be equated to stealing. Therefore, the distribution key would always be 100:0, which 
removes the differences between the efficiency and the transfer conditions. 
217 This is in line with prior analyses; eg, Easterbrook and Fischel, n 12 above; Bebchuk, n 28 above; 
Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above. 
218 This would be the ‘last bid’ of B2 in an auction against B1. 
219 Assuming the legality of such an agreement; the agreement described here is but a form of anti-
competitive ‘bid-rigging’ (see M. Pesendorfer, ‘A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions’ (2000) 67 The 
Review of Economic Studies 381, who describes this behaviour in another context). Within the EU, this could 
be contrary to Art 81 (1) EC Treaty (see the wide definition in the Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept 
Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 27.4.2004, C 101/7). 
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This would be an application of the famous Coase-theorem,220 summarised in 
its ‘strong version’ by Zerbe as follows: ‘In a world of zero transaction costs, the 
allocation of resources will be efficient, and invariant with respect to legal rules of 
liability, income effects aside’.221 
The ability to post a bid in the control auction, however, is analogous to what is 
referred to as a right assigned to an ‘open class’ in the context of the Coase’s 
invariance hypothesis;222 the new bidder does not have to buy his right to 
participate in the auction. As Holderness showed, however, the Coase-theorem in 
its strong version only applies to rights assigned to a ‘closed class’.223 Therefore, 
even without taking transaction costs into account, bargaining between the 
indeterminate group of bidders cannot always solve the problems.  
In other words, B1 and the non-controlling shareholders might often be 
unwilling to pay a ‘bribe’ to 2 for leaving the auction, as S will probably try to re-
open the auction in order to reap a higher price. As 1’s maximum price for S’s 
control-block is ‘handicapped’ by the fact that he generates a relatively large 
portion of the efficiency gains through a high ∆, S might be able to find yet 
another bidder ?  with a higher reservation price for the shares than 1’s post-
bribe price.  Naturally, 1 and the non-controlling shareholders will not be able to 
pay ‘bribes’ to every potential new bidder. Being aware of this problem, 1 will 
not even try to bribe 2 in the first place. 
Another question is whether bargaining between all shareholders (including 
S) and 1 will lead to him, rather than 2 taking control.224 Applying the Coase-
theorem, the answer is clear: in the absence of transaction costs, yes. The bargain 
would look as follows:225 1 pays his reservation price for the whole company 
@7 ;226 S and the non-controlling shareholders then bargain for a distribution of 
this sum, which by definition can always lead to a Pareto-improvement as 
compared with the current situation; S, therefore gets a price higher than  "#$ , 
while the non-controlling members get a price higher than their A@BC?D 
%BC?D  . With this kind of bargaining, therefore, it is unsurprisingly always 
                                                     
220 R. Coase, ‘The Federal Communications Commission’ (1959) 2 Journal of Law & Economics 1 and ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 The journal of Law and Economics 1. 
221 The strong version of the Coase-thorem includes the so-called ‘invariance hypothesis’, not only 
predicting efficient but also the same outcomes, irrespective of the legal rules. See Zerbe, n 137 above, 4-5. 
222 Open and closed classes in the context of the ‘strong’ (ie, invariance) version of the Coase-theorem 
were first discussed by C.G. Holderness, ‘The Assignment of Rights, Entry Effects, and the Allocation of 
Resources’ (1989) 18 The Journal of Legal Studies 181. 
223 ibid, 187. S. Medema and O. Zerbe, ‘The Coase Theorem’ in B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000) 843, argue that ‘open class’-cases are 
actually already implicitly excluded by the requirement of defined property rights. 
224 Note that we are now concerned with the allocation of the shares as a whole, rather than with simply 
submitting a bid. 
225 Alternative solutions, such as a buy-out offer by S before selling to B1 (Bebchuk, n 28 above, 966-967) 
differ only in form, not in substance, from the model described here. 
226 Or, indeed, any price exceeding the current value of the company (@); the result is indifferent from an 
efficiency point of view, as any price between these two values leads to the same allocation result. 
Differences exist, of course, regarding the distribution of the gains. 
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the most efficient bidder who wins the auction, as 1’s payment can always be 
allocated as among S and the non-controlling shareholders in a way superior to 
any other bidder’s maximum payment.227 
However, this kind of bargaining is unlikely to happen for various reasons. 
First, negotiations with (or among) a widely-dispersed shareholder body are costly 
per se; second, free-rider problems could obstruct the negotiations.228 Furthermore, 
part of the PBCs S currently enjoys will sometimes involve some sort of illicit 
conduct on the part of S; hence, S will not be able to use these parts of his current 
share value as a bargaining-chip in the negotiations with his fellow shareholders, 
without risking to be deprived of the corresponding values without consideration 
by court action. All of these reasons constitute ‘transaction costs’ in the sense of 
the Coase-theorem; they will normally prevent reaching a win-win compromise.229 
Consequently, it is not possible to rely on bargaining between the 
shareholders in an MR-environment to achieve the same ‘first-best’ results realised 
by the MBR in the described situations. 
 
PRIVATE SALES AND PARTIAL BIDS 
 
A final remark relates to seemingly similar findings for tender offers in Berle-
Means-companies.230 In this context, it is suggested that decision-making 
problems sometimes lead to a less efficient bidder taking control, if partial bids are 
allowed. Similar to the situation described here, where shareholders are confronted 
with two offers, one partial by B2, and one full bid by B1 (which is superior), they 
might sometimes accept the higher (but overall inferior) partial bid, due to 
collective action problems.231 
Grossman and Hart use that to model the optimal voting structure for a 
company’s stock.232 Although the problems identified in this work are similar in so 
far as one bidder (B2) will be able to ‘offer more’ due to higher PBCs, it is 
important to note the differences, too. In tender offers for widely-dispersed 
companies these inefficiencies only happen if, and to the extent that, shareholders 
expect other shareholders to tender into the lower full bid, therefore leaving them 
with a higher proportion of the purchase price from the partial bid (as it will not 
be pro-rated).233 In real-life situations, however, this is unlikely to happen. In 
Grossman and Hart’s variant, the model assumes that shareholders tender into 
one offer, while expecting the other bidder to take control;234 this will rarely be the 
                                                     
227 Unsurprisingly, as the amount to be distributed is, in effect @7. Ex hypothesi, VB1 is higher than any 
other @?. B1 simply wins as the ‘cake is the biggest’ in negotiations with him. 
228 See, eg, Bebchuk, n 28 above, 966-967. See, also, Bebchuk, n 9 above, for an alternative way to tackle 
the collective action problems. 
229 Some attempts to facilitate a negotiation between target shareholders and B1 in order to allow efficient 
transactions otherwise blocked by the MBR can be seen in the ‘whitewash-rules’ of the City Code. 
230 Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above; Grossman and Hart, n 9 above. 
231 ibid. 
232 ibid. 
233 Grossman and Hart, n 87 above, 191. 
234 ibid.  
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case, as B2 will make his offer conditional on receiving the majority of votes. 
Similarly, B1 will only purchase the shares, where he receives enough shares to 
control the company; this might alleviate the problem.  
Furthermore, it has to be borne in mind that the same logic would apply, 
where one person (eg the manager) submits a bid for, say, 0.5% of the shares at an 
enormously high price. In the Grossman and Hart model,235 all shareholders 
would, again, try to place their shares with this offer, and so every other bid could 
be eliminated at relatively small costs. It is doubtful whether the decision-making 
dilemma of the shareholders indeed reaches that far. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Building on prior work in this area, this paper analyses the efficiency of the 
mandatory bid rule and the market rule, respectively. It is suggested that the 
importance of synergies – commonly accepted as a main driver of takeover activity 
– needs to be re-emphasised. This is done here by explicitly including synergies 
into the notion of private benefits and accepting that they might be an important 
factor distinguishing bidders in any given legal system; this also calls into question 
common methods of using block premia in control transactions as a proxy for 
less-than-perfect investor protection rules. 
It is further argued that the mandatory bid rule prevents some inefficient 
transactions from happening, where the bidder cannot easily be classified as a 
‘looter’. Anti-theft rules are therefore no adequate substitute for a mandatory bid 
rule in all circumstances. 
Finally, it is shown that the mandatory bid rule offers some additional 
advantages over a purely deregulatory approach in auction-like private sales-of-
control; these, likewise, cannot easily be substituted by investor protection-
regulation. On the contrary, where synergies are the only source of private 
benefits, the mandatory bid rule might be seen as fulfilling this ‘efficiency 
screening’-function at relatively low cost. 
It is sometimes argued that the mandatory bid rule is desirable from a fairness 
or equality point of view, and that this might outweigh some of its apparent 
efficiency disadvantages. Javaras, however, warns that ‘equality’ can only be 
justified if it somehow improves the functioning of the securities market’.236 
Although the analysis in this paper certainly does not cover all aspects of the 
related questions, and still more work needs to be done, the results presented here 
suggest that the mandatory bid rule might be more likely to pass this test than is 
commonly assumed. 
                                                     
235 See, also, Bergström, Högfeldt, and Molin, n 53 above. 
236 Javaras, n 40 above, 428. 
